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Abstract
Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSR) were introduced by M. Goresky and A. Klapper in
1993. They are similar to classical Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) used in many pseudorandom
generators. The main difference is the fact that the elementary additions are not additions modulo 2 but
with propagation of carries. The main problem for the use of a FCSR automaton is the fact that the
generated sequences are predictable.
In order to remove this weakness of FCSR-based generators, we propose to ﬁlter the state of the
FCSR with a linear function. This method is efﬁcient since the FCSR structure is not related to a linear
property.
This paper presents an extensive study of FCSR automata, a security analysis of our generator
(concerning linear and 2-adic cryptanalysis, algebraic attack, correlation attack...), and a practical
example of parameters in order to design this generator. An important point concerning this generator
is the fact that it is simple and efﬁcient, both in hardware and software implementation.
Keywords: Pseudorandom generator, shift register, 2-adic numbers, periodic sequences, secret
key cryptography.
INTRODUCTION
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) are the most common tool used to design fast random
generators. Their properties are well known, among them the fact that the structure of a plain
LFSR can be easily recovered from its output by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. Many
methods have been used to thwart the Berlekamp-Massey attack because the high speed and
simplicity of LFSRs are important beneﬁts. One of the most popular is the use of a non-linear
Boolean function which inputs are some internal states of an LFSR automaton [23].
Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSR) were introduced by M. Goresky and A. Klapper
in [10]. They are similar to classical Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) used in many
pseudorandom generators. The main difference is the fact that the elementary additions are not
additions modulo 2 but with propagation of carries.
The mathematical models for LFSR are equivalently linear recurring sequences over GF(2)
or rational series in the ring GF(2)[[x]]. For FCSR, the “good” model is the one of rational
2-adic numbers (cf. [12], [9]).
As for the LFSR case, FCSR sequences are predictable and therefore not suitable for crypto-
graphic usage. Given a certain amount of successive output bits one can use the algorithms in
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[11], [4], [13] to reconstruct the FCSR and hence break the generator. In an earlier paper [3],
the authors presented a pseudorandom generator which was obtained by combining both LFSR
and FCSR architectures. This generator remains unattacked, however a practical implementation
is not easy, in particular it needs to generate primes satisfying strong conditions at each use.
The main idea brought by this paper is to ﬁlter the internal states of a FCSR with a linear
Boolean function. This is possible since the resistance to linear attacks comes from the FCSR
generator itself. Moreover, there are many advantages in the use of such a linear function. The
ﬁrst one is the fact that linear Boolean function have the best resistance to correlation attacks.
The second one is the fact that, for a ﬁxed size of inputs, they are the most efﬁcient Boolean
function from the point of view of times and circuit complexity, both in software and hardware
implementations.
In our generator, the connection integer of the LFSR and the ﬁlter functions are public and
need no computation before use. The only secret is the internal state of the automaton which
initially depends directly from the key.
The statistical properties of the generated sequences are those of 2-adic sequences [3], [4],
[10], [11], [12], [9]. The length of the period is proved and is about 2128 for a FCSR of size
128.
The ﬁrst part of this paper is devoted to present background on the link between eventually
periodic binary sequences and 2-adic numbers. We recall the notion of 2-adic complexity and
the generation of such sequences using shift registers and Galois architecture [9], [3].
The Galois architecture comes directly from the computation of 2-adic fractions. This is
simply the circuit computing the 2-adic expansion of the quotient p/q of two integers p and q:
it computes numbers s0, s1, s2 ...such that p/q = s0 + s12 + s222 + ... .
The second part contains an extensive study of the FCSR automaton in its Galois version.
Some symmetry properties of 2-adic sequences of maximal length are pointed out. It is important
to emphasize that the output and the time/circuit complexity of our generator depends not only
on the choice of a 2-adic fraction p/q, but also on the circuit which computes this fraction, i.e.
the Galois circuit described in the ﬁrst part.
Finally, the design and analysis of the new generator is presented in the third part. We give
the criteria for the choice of the connection integer and the ﬁlter function. Then, as an example
of practical implementation, we give a suitable set of parameters. Finally, we present a security
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analysis of our ﬁltered FCSR (statistical properties, algebraic attack, correlation attack...).
I. THE 2-ADIC FCSR ARCHITECTURES FOR EVENTUALLY PERIODIC BINARY SEQUENCES
A. Representation of eventually periodic binary
sequences with 2-adic numbers
First, we will recall brieﬂy some basic properties of 2-adic numbers. For more theoretical
approach the reader can refer to [14].
A 2-adic integer is formally a power series s =
P∞
n=0 sn2n, sn ∈ {0,1}. Such a series does
not always converge in the classical sense. However, it can be considered as a formal object.
Actually, this series always converges if we consider the 2-adic topology. The set of 2-adic
integers is denoted by Z2.
Addition and multiplication in Z2 can be performed by reporting the carries to the higher
order terms, i.e. 2n + 2n = 2n+1 for all n ∈ N.
If there exists an integer N such that sn = 0 for all n ≥ N, then s is a positive integer.
An important remark is the fact that −1 =
P∞
n=0 2n, which is easy to verify by computing
1 +
P∞
n=0 2n = 0. This fact allows us to compute the negative of a 2-adic integer easily: if
s = 2n +
P∞
i=n+1 si2i, then −s = 2n +
P∞
i=n+1(1 − si)2i. In particular, this implies that s is a
negative integer if and only if there exists an integer N such that sn = 1 for all n ≥ N.
Moreover, every odd integer q has an inverse in Z2 which can be computed by the formula
q−1 =
P∞
n=0 q0n, where q = 1 − q0.
The following theorem gives a complete characterization of eventually periodic 2-adic binary
sequences in terms of 2-adic integers (see [9] for the proof).
Theorem 1: Let S = (sn)n∈N be a binary sequence and s =
P∞
n=0 sn2n be the associated
2-adic integer. The sequence S is eventually periodic if and only if there exist two numbers p
and q in Z, q odd, such that s = p/q. Moreover, S is strictly periodic if and only if pq ≤ 0 and
|p| ≤ |q|.
An important fact is that the period of the rational number p/q is known since the time of
Gauss (cf. [9]):
Theorem 2: Let S be an eventually periodic binary sequence, let s = p/q, with q odd and p
and q coprime, be the corresponding 2-adic number in its rational representation. The period of
S is the order of 2 modulo q, i.e., the smallest integer t such that 2t ≡ 1 (mod q).
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B. Realization of eventually periodic binary sequences with FCSR circuits
In the sequel, we identify the sequence S = (sn)n∈N and the 2-adic integer s =
Pn
i=0 si2i.
The 2-adic division p/q can be performed by a Galois architecture using Feedback with
Carry Shift Register (FCSR circuits). For simplicity, we will only consider p ≥ 0 and odd
q = 1 − q0 < 0. If pq > 0, it is easy to compute −p/q and then to obtain p/q by the formula
−s = 2n +
P∞
i=n+1(1 − si)2i.
Under the hypothesis q < 0 ≤ p, p < −q, p =
Pk−1
i=0 pi2i, q = 1−2d and d =
Pk−1
i=0 di2i, the
2-adic division p/q is performed by the following circuit:
pk−1 - pk−2 - p1 - p0 - -
6
d p
6
d p
6
6
d p
6
6
d p
6
- dk−1 - dk−2 - d1 - d0
Where the symbol  denotes the addition with carry, i.e., it corresponds to the following
scheme:
 
H H
- a
- b
- cn−1
- s=a⊕b⊕cn−1
cn=ab⊕acn−1⊕bcn−1

Deﬁnition 1: The 2-adic complexity of a binary eventually periodic sequence is the length
(i.e., the number of cells) of the smallest FCSR generating S.
Remark 1: Let S be a binary sequence. If S = p/q with p and q coprime integers, then the
2-adic (or FCSR) complexity Λ2 of S is the maximum of bit lengths of |p| and |q| (cf. [9]).
As for the LFSR generators, a binary sequence generated by a FCSR generator cannot be
used directly for cryptographic applications since it is easy to recover this structure with a kind
of Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [11], or with the Euclidean algorithm applied to integers [4]:
Theorem 3: (Euclidean Algorithm Synthesis [4], [13]) Let S be a an eventually periodic
sequence with 2-adic complexity Λ2. Then it is possible to compute integers p,q such that the
2-adic expansion of p/q is S, using only the ﬁrst 2Λ2 + 1 bits of S and in time O(Λ2
2).
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C. Statistical quality of 2-adic binary sequences
By checking for low 2-adic complexity, it is possible to distinguish binary sequences produced
by a FCSR from truly random sequences. However, except for this speciﬁc test, no standard
statistical test seems to be able to reveal some bias from what is expected from a random
sequence. Most pseudorandom generators are based on LFSRs which produces linear recurring
sequences and have a non-linear part to break the linear properties in the output sequence. It
is often an implicit assumption that it sufﬁces to break these linear properties to get a good
pseudorandom generator. In order to study the security of our generator, we will use a similar
hypothesis. Let S be a binary periodic sequence generated by a FCSR with negative prime
divisor q such that the order of 2 modulo q is exactly T = |q|−1, i.e. the period of S is T. We
will assume that, except of its 2-adic low complexity, the sequence S appears as random among
the family of periodic sequences of period T.
In particular, We have checked that the sequences produced by a FCSR generator succeeded
the NIST statistical test suite [19].
There exists another argument about the good statistical quality of the FCSR sequences:
in our practical application (cf. Part III) we consider a negative prime number q such that
2128 < −q < 2129. Moreover, the period of the generated sequence is |q| − 1. Consider any
sequence (s0,...,s127) of 128 bits. Let s =
P128
i=0 si2i be the corresponding integer. Set p = sq
(mod 2128). Then the sequence (s0,...,s127) is the ﬁrst 128 bits of the 2-adic expansion of p/q.
In other word, since, except for p = 0, there is a single cycle, any sequence of 128 bits appears
in a 2-adic sequence generated by our FCSR generator with a non-zero initialization.
II. THE FCSR AUTOMATON
This section is devoted to an extensive study of a FCSR circuit considered as an automaton.
A. Description of the automaton
Let q = 1 − 2d be a negative integer. The FCSR generator with connection integer q can be
described as a circuit containing two registers:
• The main register M with k binary memories (one for each cell), where k is the bit length
of d, that is 2k−1 ≤ d < 2k.
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• The carry register C with l binary memories (one for each cell with a  at its left) where
l + 1 is the Hamming weight of d. Using the binary expansion
Pk−1
i=0 di2i of d, we put
Id = {i | 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and di = 1}. We also put d∗ = d − 2k−1. The integer l is then the
cardinal of Id and the Hamming weight of d∗.
We will say that the main register contains the integer m =
Pk−1
i=0 mi2i when it contains the
binary values (m0,...,mk−1). The content m of the main register always satisﬁes 0 ≤ m ≤
2k−1. In order to use similar notation for the carry register, we can think of it as a k bit register
where the k − l bits of rank not in Id are always 0. The content c =
P
i∈Id ci2i of the carry
register always satisﬁes 0 ≤ c ≤ d∗.
Example 1: Let q = −347, so d = 174 = 0xAE, k = 8 and l = 4. The following diagram
shows these two registers:
m(t) m7 m6 m5 m4 m3 m2 m1 m0 - - - - - - - - -
6 6 6 6
c(t) 0 0 c5 0 c3 c2 c1 0
? ? ? ?
6 6 6 6
d 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
B. Transition function
As described above, the FCSR circuit with connection integer q is an automaton with 2k+l
states corresponding to the k + l binary memories of main and carry registers. We say that the
FCSR circuit is in state (m,c) if the main and carry registers contain respectively the binary
expansion of m and of c.
Suppose that at time t, the FCSR circuit is in state (m(t),c(t)) with m =
Pk−1
i=0 mi(t)2i and
c =
Pk−1
i=0 ci(t)2i. The state (m(t + 1),c(t + 1)) at time t + 1 is computed using:
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and i / ∈ Id
mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t)
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and i ∈ Id
mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t) ⊕ ci(t) ⊕ m0(t)
ci(t + 1) := mi+1(t)ci(t) ⊕ ci(t)m0(t)
⊕ m0(t)mi+1(t)
• For the case i = k − 1
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mk−1(t + 1) := m0(t).
Note that this transition function is described with (at most) quadratic Boolean functions and
that for all three cases mi(t + 1) can be expressed with a single formula:
mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t) ⊕ dici(t) ⊕ dim0(t)
if we put mk(t) = 0 and ck−1(t) = 0.
The transition function can also be described with the following global presentation (expressing
integers m(t),c(t) instead of bits mi(t),ci(t)) more suitable for software implementations (here
⊕ denotes bitwise addition without carries, and ⊗ denotes bitwise AND):
m(t + 1) := bm(t)/2c ⊕ c(t) ⊕ m0(t)d
c(t + 1) := bm(t)/2c ⊗ c(t) ⊕ c(t) ⊗ m0(t)d ⊕ m0(t)d ⊗ bm(t)/2c
Remark 2: The case d = 2k−1 (that is Id = ∅) gives a circuit with no feedback and generating
a periodic sequence of period length k. If we exclude this uninteresting case, we have
2
k < |q| < 2
k+1.
C. Sequences and cycles generated by the automaton
If m =
Pk−1
i=0 mi2i is the content of the main register, we denote by m =
Pk−1
i=0(1−mi)2i the
binary complement of m. We have m = 2k−1−m. We let c =
P
i∈Id ci2i, the integer contained
in the carry register, we denote by c =
P
i∈Id(1 − ci)2i the integer obtained by complementing
the “useful” bits of c. We have c = d − 2k−1 − c.
Lemma 1: Suppose that the transition function of the FCSR automaton applied to a state
(m,c) gives a state (m0,c0). Then the transition function applied to the state (m,c) gives the
state (m0,c0).
Proof: The elementary parts of the automation are addition boxes . If we change the
input of such a box, complementing all three entries, the two bits the box gives in output are
complemented accordingly. The FCSR automaton inherits this property.
Lemma 2: Assume that the FCSR is in state (m,c) at time t and is in state (m0,c0) at time t+1
after one transition. Put p = m + 2c and p0 = m0 + 2c0. Then we have 2p0 ≡ p modulo q.
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Proof: The operators ⊕ and ⊗ allow us to compute addition without carries and carries
separately. More precisely, if u,v,w are integers, we have
u + v = (u ⊕ v) + 2(v ⊗ v)
and
u + v + w = (u ⊕ v ⊕ w) + 2(u ⊗ v ⊕ v ⊗ w ⊕ w ⊗ u).
If m0 = 0 the expression of the transition function gives 2m0 = m ⊕ 2c and 2c0 = m ⊗ 2c. So,
we get
2p0 = (m ⊕ 2c) + 2(m ⊗ 2c) = m + 2c = p.
If m0 = 1 we have 2m0 = (m−1)⊕2c⊕2d and 2c0 = (m−1)⊗2c⊕2c⊗2d⊕2d⊗(m−1).
So 2p0 = ((m − 1) ⊕ 2c ⊕ 2d) +
2((m − 1) ⊗ 2c ⊕ 2c ⊗ 2d ⊕ 2d ⊗ (m − 1))
= m − 1 + 2c + 2d = m + 2c − q = p − q.
In both cases, we get 2p0 ≡ p modulo q.
Proposition 1: Assume that the FCSR is initially in state (m,c) and let p = m + 2c. Then
0 ≤ p ≤ |q| and the sequence generated by the FCSR is the 2-adic expansion of p/q.
Proof: We have 0 ≤ m ≤ 2k − 1 and 0 ≤ c ≤ d∗ = d − 2k−1. So,
0 ≤ m + 2c ≤ 2
k − 1 + 2(d − 2
k−1) = 2d − 1 = |q|.
This shows that 0 ≤ p ≤ |q|. For the second part of the claim, Lemma 2 shows that, after t
transitions, the FCSR outputs the lowest weight bit of (2−tp) mod q. So, the sequence obtained
for t ∈ N is the 2-adic expansion of p/q.
Remark 3: If 0 ≤ p ≤ |q| then there exists at least one state (m,c) of the FCSR automaton
such that p = m + 2c. For the four values p = 0, 1, |q| − 1, and q, this state is unique and is
respectively (0,0), (1,0), (2k − 2,d∗) and (2k − 1,d∗).
The following proposition is well known (cf. eg [8]). It is direct consequence of Lemma 1.
Proposition 2: Assume that the order of 2 modulo q is |q| − 1. By Theorem 1, the sequence
generated by the FCSR is periodic. The period consists of two half-periods where the second
half is the binary complement of the ﬁrst.
Remark 4: Different initial states can produce identical sequences:
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The following array shows, for an example, the distinct cycles and the accessible or not
accessible states. We choose q = −13, k = 3, d = 7 = 1 + 2 + 22 so d∗ = 3 = 1 + 2 and the
allowed values for c are 0, 1, 2 and 3. The automaton contains 3 + 2 = 5 cells and so has 32
distinct states.
Two of these states form cycles of length 1:
(m,c) = (0,0) corresponding to the fraction p/q = 0,
(m,c) = (7,3) corresponding to the fraction p/q = −1.
There is also one cycle of length 12, and the remaining 18 states converge to this main cycle
after few transitions:
p = m + 2c (m,c) (m,c) (m,c) (m,c)
1 (1,0)
↓
7 (7,0) (5,1) (3,2) (1,3)
↓ ←- ←- ←-
10 (4,3) (6,2)
↓ ←-
5 (1,2) (5,0) (3,1)
↓ ←- ↓
9 (5,2) (7,1) (3,3)
↓ ↓ ←-
11 (7,2) (5,3)
↓ ←− ←-
12 (6,3)
↓
6 (0,3) (6,0) (2,2) (4,1)
↓ ←- ←- ←-
3 (3,0) (1,1)
↓ ←-
8 (6,1) (2,3) (4,2)
↓ ←- ↓
4 (2,1) (0,2) (4,0)
↓ ↓ ←-
2 (0,1) (2,0)
↓ ←− ←-
1 (1,0)
D. Sequences produced by the main register
We now study the sequences of values taken by the binary memories of the main register,
that is the sequences Mi = (mi(t))t∈N, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
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Theorem 4: Consider the FCSR automaton with (negative) connection integer q = 1−2d. Let
k be the bit length of d. Then, for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, there exists an integer pi such
that Mi is the 2-adic expansion of pi/q.
These integers are given by the following recursive relations:
pi =



qmi(0) + 2pi+1 if di = 0
q(mi(0) + 2ci(0)) + 2(pi+1 + p0) if di = 1.
Proof: The result is already known for i = 0 because M0 is the sequence generated by the
FCSR. Let us show it for i = k − 1. For all t ∈ N, we have mk−1(t + 1) = m0(t). So we get
P∞
t=0 mk−1(t) · 2t = mk−1(0) + 2
P∞
t=0 mk−1(t + 1) · 2t
= mk−1(0) + 2
P∞
t=0 m0(t) · 2t = mk−1(0) + 2p0/q.
So the claim is true with pk−1 = qmk−1(0) + 2p0.
We next show the result by induction for 1 ≤ i ≤ k−2. Following the same method as above
we obtain:
P∞
t=0 mi(t) · 2t = mi(0) + 2
P∞
t=0 mi+1(t) · 2t if di = 0, and
P∞
t=0 mi(t) · 2t = mi(0) + 2ci(0) +
2
P∞
t=0 (mi+1(t) + m0(t)) · 2t if di = 1.
where di is the i-th binary digit of d. This proves the claim with
pi =



qmi(0) + 2pi+1 if di = 0
q(mi(0) + 2ci(0)) + 2(pi+1 + p0) if di = 1.
Example 2: We consider the prime q = −347. Using the relations of Theorem 4 we can
compute the pi for 1 ≤ p ≤ k −1 as a function of p0. For simplicity, we denote by mi = mi(0)
and ci = ci(0) the initial states of the main and carry registers.
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p7 = q × m7 + 2p0
p6 = q × m6 + 2p7 = q(m6 + 2m7) + 4p0
p5 = q × (m5 + 2c5) + 2(p6 + p0)
= q × (m5 + 2m6 + 4m7 + 2c5) + 10p0
p4 = q × m4 + 2p5 = q × (m4 + 2m5 + 4m6
+8m7 + 4c5) + 20p0
p3 = q × (m3 + 2c3) + 2(p4 + p0)
= q × (m3 + 2m4 + 4m5 + 8m6 + 16m7 + 2c3
+8c5) + 42p0
p2 = q × (m2 + 2c2) + 2(p3 + p0)
= q × (m2 + 2m3 + 4m4 + 8m5 + 16m6
+32m7 + 2c2 + 4c3 + 16c5) + 86p0
p1 = q × (m1 + 2c1) + 2(p2 + p0)
= q × (m1 + 2m2 + 4m3 + 8m4 + 16m5
+32m6 + 64m7 + 2c1 + 4c2 + 8c3 + 32c5)
+174p0
p0 = q × m0 + 2p1
= q × (m0 + 2m1 + 4m2 + 8m3 + 16m4
+32m5 + 64m6 + 128m7 + 4c1 + 8c2
+16c3 + 64c5) + 348p0
Recall that q = −347 so that the last expression for p0 is consistent with p0 = m+2c where
m =
P7
i=0 mi2i and c =
P7
i=0 ci2i are the initial contents of the two registers.
III. DESIGN OF A FILTERED FCSR AUTOMATON
As for LFSR automata, a FCSR automaton cannot be used directly for a cryptographic use: the
sequences produced have good statistical properties and high linear complexity, but the 2-adic
structure can be recovered easily as shown by [11], [13] and also by Theorem 3.
For the LFSR case many tools have been developed to mask the structure of the generator, by
using Boolean functions with suitable properties (see for example [6]) to combine several LFSR,
by using combiners with memory [18] or by shrinking the sequence produced by a LFSR [7].
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It is possible to use similar methods with a FCSR generator, but with an important difference:
since a FCSR generator looks like a random generator from the point of view of linearity, it is
not necessary to use a ﬁlter function with high non-linearity.
In order to design our generator, we need a FCSR generator (deﬁned by a connection integer
q) and a ﬁlter (a linear Boolean function). In this part, we explain how to choose the connection
integer and the ﬁlter. Then we propose a set of values for these parameters. Finally, we describe
in detail how to use this generator. In particular, we present several ways to proceed for the
initialization phase.
Note that the connection integer q and the ﬁlter function F must be public.
A. Choice of the connection integer
For 0 < p < |q|, the period T of the sequences associated to the binary expansion of p/q is
the order of 2 modulo q.
The maximum value for T is |q| − 1, and this can be reached only if q is a prime.
To avoid a preperiod, this prime q must be negative.
For a key of k bits, the binary size of q must be k + 1, i.e. 2k < |q| < 2k+1.
The transition function of a FCSR automaton is quadratic. However, the quadratic (nonlinear)
part of this transition function shows up in the cells of the carry register. So the expense of
this quadratic part is directly related to the number l of cells in the carry register. We propose
to use a FCSR satisfying the condition l ≥ k/2. In another words, the Hamming weight of
d = (−q + 1)/2 should be strictly greater than k/2.
Remember that, under the hypothesis ”the order of 2 modulo q is −q−1”, the second part of
the period is the complement of the ﬁrst one. So the actual length of our unreapeted sequence is
T 0 = T/2. Note that xoring an even number of sequences of period T possessing this complement
property gives a sequence of period at most T 0. Under the extra condition ”T/2 = (−q − 1)/2
is a prime”, the period of a sequence obtained by xoring some sequences of period T is either
1, T 0 or T.
The recommendations for the choice of q are
• q is a negative prime
• 2k < |q| < 2k+1
• the order of 2 modulo q is −q − 1
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• (−q − 1)/2 is a prime
• w(d) > k/2
Note that the existence of an inﬁnity of primes satisfying the condition ”the order of 2 modulo
q is −q − 1” is a conjecture (Artin’s conjecture), not a proved fact. However, for k = 128, we
obtained a lot of primes satisfying all the above conditions using MAGMA [5].
B. Design of the ﬁlter
As previously mentioned, since a FCSR automaton is non-linear, there is no need to use a
Boolean function with a high non-linearity for ﬁlter the output. Then the best functions for
ﬁltering a FCSR generators are linear functions for at least two reasons:
- these functions are optimal from the point of view of resilience and stop a possible correlation
attack;
they are the more efﬁcient Boolean functions for both hardware and software implementation.
A linear function is of the form
f : GF(2)n 7→ GF(2),
f(x1,...,xn) =
Ln
i=1 fixi, fi ∈ GF(2).
As studied previously, the sequence Mi observed on the i-th dividend register is a 2-adic
fraction, with known period, good statistical properties and looks like a random sequence except
from the point of view of 2-adic complexity.
The sequence Ci, i ∈ I∗
d is not so good from a statistical point of view: These sequences seem
experimentally balanced. However, if a carry register is in the state 1 (resp. 0), it remains in the
same state 1 (resp. 0) with a probability 3/4 since each of the 2 other entries of the corresponding
addition box corresponds to 2-adic fractions and produce a 1 with a probability approximatively
1/2. It is sufﬁcient to have only one more 1 to produces a 1 in the carry register.
These remarks lead us to ﬁlter only on the k cells mi(t) of the main register, not on the cells
of the carry register.
To model our linear combiner (the ﬁlter), we consider a binary vector F = (f0,...,fk−1) of
length k.
The output sequence of our ﬁltered FCSR is then
S = (s(t))t∈N, where s(t) =
n M
i=1
fi · mi(t).
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Set kF = blog2(F)c. We will see in Paragraph IV-C that it is possible to develop an attack
on the initial key which needs 4kF trials.
If F is a power of 2, the output is a 2-adic sequence and is not resistant to 2-adic attacks.
Moreover, if F is known, and its binary expansion contains few 1s, the ﬁrst equations of the
algebraic attack are simpler, even if it is not possible to develop such attack (cf. Paragraph IV-E).
A ﬁrst natural solution would be to choose F = 2128 − 1, that is to xor all the cells of the
main register. In this case, suppose that the output is S = (s(t))t∈N. It is easy to check that the
sequence S0 = (s(t) + s(t + 1))t∈N is the same as those that would be obtained by xoring all
the carry cells. Even if we do not know how to use this fact for cryptanalysis, we prefer to use
another ﬁlter for this reason.
In our application, we propose to choose F = d = (|q| + 1)/2. With this ﬁlter, the output is
the XOR of all cells of the main register which are just at the right of a carry cell.
C. Proposed parameters
We propose for q the following negative prime, which satisﬁes the conditions of Section A.
−q = 493877400643443608888382048200783943827. (1)
The binary expansion of d = (|q| + 1)/2 is
1011100111000110101010011110101010110111111000100101111111010110100111101000011
0001101101001101000011000010101101110110001001010.
Its Hamming weight is 69 and then there are l = 68 carry cells ( the Hamming weight of
d∗ = d−2128) and k = 128 cells in the main register. The proposed ﬁlter is F = d = (−q+1)/2.
D. Using the F-FCSR generator
We propose 4 methods for the initialization of the generator with the connection prime deﬁned
in (1) :
• Size of the key: 128 bits. Use the key K directly to initialize the main register M.
Advantage: the size of key match those of many cryptosystems.
Drawback: The fact that the initial values for the carry cells is known (to be 0) simpliﬁes
the ﬁrst equations involved in the algebraic attack (see Part IV-E). However, in this case,
the ﬁrst equation involved is a linear sum of 69 unknowns and the second equation is
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yet quadratic with 128 unknowns. Even in this context, the algebraic attack remains more
difﬁcult than an exhaustive one.
• Size of the key: 128+68=196 bits. Use the key directly to initialize the cells of both the
main and carry registers. Advantage: the algebraic attack is more difﬁcult. Drawback: the
size of key is larger.
• Size of key: 128 bits. The key is expanded to 196 bits by a classical derivation key algorithm.
This new key is used as in the previous method.
• Size of key: 128 bits. This method is a variant of the previous one. The FCSR automaton
is used to extend the key in a simple manner : ﬁrst, the main register is initialized with the
bits of the key and the carry register to 0. Then, the ﬁrst k bits outputted by the generator
are discarded. After k transitions occurred, the carry register (the main also) contains values
unknown to a potential attacker. The subsequent generated bits are used for the application.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE F-FCSR GENERATOR
A pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) must satisfy some properties:
• For any initialization, the output sequence looks like a random sequence.
• Knowing any subsequence of the output, it shall not be practically feasible to compute
predecessors or successors, or to guess them with a probability that is non-negligibly larger
than by chance.
In addition, if possible, backward secrecy is required: even if the attacker knows the current
internal state, it shall not be practically feasible to compute predecessors, or to guess them with a
probability that is non-negligibly larger than by chance. Generally, this third point is not satisﬁed
by the pseudorandom generators used for stream ciphers. It is the situation for our generator, as
well as for LFSR based generators and for most automaton based generators.
Practically, it is not so easy to show that a generator satisﬁes the two needed properties.
Theoretically, any sequence can be generated by a ”true” random generator. Generally, if it
is possible to prove something about the randomness of the output of a PRNG, it is a non-
secure generator. Practically, a PRGN must success various experimental tests concerning the
distribution of outputs.
A PRGN is not a random generator, since there exists a masked structure: its Kolmorov
complexity is small, for example 128 instead of an expected complexity of T ' 2128 for a
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random periodic sequence of period T. Theoretically, successors are always uniquely determined
by the knowledge of a short subsequence.
Practically, to check the second point, there exists a list of possible structures and a list of
possible attacks, and the designer have to prove or to convince the cryptanalyst that the PRGN
is resistant to these attacks. However, nobody can be absolutely certain that there exist no other
attack or lackness.
The main possible attacks and/or lackness are:
• A small linear complexity. Either a generator has a masked linear structure of uses some
functions close to linear one. In that case, it may be possible to prove something about the
linear complexity. Or the generator has no linear structure, it becomes impossible to prove
something. However, the output sequence looks like a random sequence from the point of
view of linear complexity. Possibly, there exist some heuristic arguments that are not a
proof. In that case, the PRGN must satisfy some dedicated test. There exist a paradox: a
priori the second case can be better from the point of view of resistance to linear attack
even if it is not possible to prove that.
• A small 2-adic complexity. The preceding remarks on linear structure hold also for 2-adic
structure. Our generator is based on 2-adic numbers, and then it needs a detailed study on
its security from this point of view. Remark that, for the LFSR based generators, the 2-adic
attacks are not studied, since LFSR are tacitly considered to behave like random about the
of 2-adic complexity.
• The correlation attacks. We will describe them later. However, these attacks use both some
linear properties and a function with bad statistical properties.
• The Algebraic attacks. It consist in modeling the problem as a polynomial system of
equations. This attack can be powerful and can exploit any weakness of a generator even
if this weakness is not known explicitly.
The main heuristic argument for the security of a ﬁltered FCSR generator is the fact the linear
operations and operations on integers are considered as non related:
• There is no known links between the factorization of integers and the factorization of
polynomials in GF(2)[X].
• Many hash functions use a successions of linear operations such as XOR, bit permutations,
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..., together with multiplication by a scalar modulo an integer n.
The resistance of our generator to linear attacks comes from the FCSR automaton.
Its resistance to 2-adic attacks comes from the linear ﬁlter.
The resistance to correlation attacks comes from the fact that there exists no linear relations
between the cells of a FCSR automaton and the fact that the ﬁlter is a linear Boolean function
with the proved best resilience.
A. Statistical properties of the ﬁltered output
When two or more sequences are xored, the resulting sequence have good statistical properties
as soon as one of the sequences is good, under the restriction that this sequence is not correlated
to the other.
In our generator, each sequence is a 2-adic fraction with denominator q and has good statistical
properties. The only problem is the fact that these sequences are not independent, since they
are obtained by distinct shifts of the same periodic sequence. If we suppose that the correlation
between two distant parts of this same periodic sequence is low, we can expect that the output
sequence will have good statistical properties.
To support this hypothesis, we used the NIST statistical test suite [19] (version 1.5) to validate
it experimentally. We have checked it using 1000 samples of 106 bits each. We used the
following blocklengths for the various tests according to the accompanying document (FIPS
Special Publication 800-22). Block Frequency test : 20000 ; Overlapping and Non Overlapping
Template tests : 9 ; Universal test : 7 (with 1280 initialization steps) ; Approximate Entropy
and Serial tests : 10 ; Linear Complexity test : 2000. All tests were passed, with the default
signiﬁcance level α = 0.01, except the Lempel-Ziv test which is known to be ﬂawed and has
been removed from the last version of the suite (cf. [24]).
B. Linear and 2-adic complexity
As mentioned previously, since linear and 2-adic operations are not related, it seems difﬁcult
to obtain any theoretical results on linear and 2-adic complexity of the outputted sequence.
Under this assumption, we expect that the linear and 2-adic complexities are those of random
sequences of period T. This assumption is comforted by the results of experimental tests.
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C. 2-adic cryptanalysis
The output of the generator is obtained by xoring some 2-adic fractions pi/q, with linear
relations between the pi’s (cf. Theorem 4). In this section, we exploit this property to develop a
speciﬁc attack. However, under some restrictions on the choice of the ﬁlter, this attack remains
more expensive than the exhaustive one.
A 2-adic attack:
Theorem 5: Assume that the ﬁlter F is known by the attacker and let kF be an integer such
that F < 2kF+1 (that is all cells selected by the ﬁlter belong to the rightmost kF +1 cells of the
main register). Then the attacker can discover the key of the generator at a cost O(2kFkFk2).
We ﬁrst state a Lemma.
Lemma 3: Assume that the attacker knows the initial values mi(0) and ci(0) for 0 ≤ i < kF.
Then he can compute the ﬁrst T bits of the sequence MkF, mkF(t) for 0 ≤ t < T, by observing
the sequence outputted by the generator, in time O(TkF).
Proof: The attacker observes ﬁrst S(0) =
LkF
i=0 fimi(0). In this equality, the only unknown
value is mkF(0). Note that, due to the deﬁnition of kF, FkF = 1, so the attacker can compute
mkF(0) in time O(kF). For subsequent bits the method generalizes as follows.
Assume that the attacker has computed bits mkF(t) for 0 ≤ t < τ. Observing the bit S(τ) he
gets
S(τ) =
kF M
i=0
Fimi(τ)
and the only unknown value here is mkF(τ). So the attacker obtains it, also in time O(kF). We
obtain the result by induction.
The attack whose existence is asserted in Theorem 5 works following ﬁve steps.
• Choose an arbitrary new set of values for the bits mi(0) and ci(0) for 0 ≤ i < kF.
• Assuming that these bits really contain the values chosen, compute the 2k + 1 ﬁrst bits of
the sequence MkF.
• Use the Euclidean Synthesis Algorithm from Theorem 3 to compute a 2-adic fraction whose
the expansion is the sequence MkF.
• Use the formulas of Theorem 4 to compute the corresponding 2-adic fraction for M0. If
the denominator is not q then return to step 1.
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• The numerator obtained is then a good candidate for the key. After all possibilities in step 1
are exhausted, use some more bits of the generator to determine which key is the true key,
among the good candidates found.
Now the proof of the Theorem:
Proof: From Lemma 3, the cost of Step 2 is in O(kkF) ≤ O(k2). Then Step 3 has also a
cost of O(k2). Each use of a formula of Theorem 4 has a cost in O(k2) so the cost of Step 4
is in O(k2kF). The loop deﬁned by Step 1 has to be iterated O(expkF) times. Multiplying the
number of iterations by the inner cost gives the cost of the whole attack.
Note that, with our parameters proposed by 1, we have k = 128 and kF = 127 and this attack
is more expensive than the exhaustive attack on the key.
D. Correlation attacks
Let R = (ri) and S = (si) be two binary sequences. The correlation between the n ﬁrst bits
of R and S is the integer α(n) =
Pn−1
i=0 (−1)ri⊕si.
For two random sequences R and S, α(n) is a random variable of average m = 0 and variance
σ2 = n.
The principle of the correlation attack on combined LFSRs is the following (cf. [22]). Let
F be the combining Boolean function of the generator. Suppose that the values of one of the
input and the output of F are not independent. The adversary chooses an initialization for the
LFSR associated to this input and computes the correlation between the sequence generated by
this LFSR alone (from a random initialization) and the sequence given by the generator. If the
initialization of the LFSR is wrong, then |α(n)| is likely to be very small. If the initialization is
correct (i.e. corresponds to the key), then |α(n)| is likely to be larger.
This attack can be generalized if there exist any dependency between the xor of t inputs of
F, and the output of F.
As a consequence, the Boolean functions used in these generators must be resilient of order t
as larger as possible, i.e. balanced and without correlation between any sum of a set of at most
t inputs, and the output.
We consider now a single ﬁltered LFSR with a Boolean function F. For a ﬁxed LFSR, it is
possible to found some linear dependencies between the internal states of the automaton. Using
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many relations, it is possible to develop a generalization of the preceding correlation attack (cf.
[23]).
There are two major obstacles to the adaptation of this attack on a ﬁltered FCSR.
The ﬁrst one is the fact that a linear function with l inputs is l −1 resilient. In that situation,
the attack is more difﬁcult than the exhaustive one.
The second one is the fact that the dependencies between the cells of a FCSR automaton are
nonlinear, since the transition function is quadratic.
E. Algebraic cryptanalysis of a F-FCSR generator
The algebraic cryptanalysis of a pseudorandom generator is a tool developed recently (cf.[1])
.
The principle is simple: we consider the bits of the initial state
m = (m0,...,mk−1) = (m0(0)...,mk−1(0)) as the set of unknowns (suppose ﬁrst that the initial
value of the carry register is 0) and, using the transition function, we compute the successive
outputs of the generator as functions fi(m0,...,mk−1) of these unknowns. If we guess the ﬁrst
bits the output by the generator, we get a system of (non-linear) equations in k variables. We
can add to this system the equations m2
i = mi as the unknowns are Boolean. If the system
obtained is not too complicated, it can be solved in some cases using for example the Gr¨ obner
basis methods cf.[2].
There is a main difference between ﬁltered LFSR generators and ﬁltered FCSR generators:
Both have a transition function T and a ﬁlter F. However, for LFSR-based generators, the
transition function Tl is linear and the ﬁlter Fnl is non-linear. For the F-FCSR generator, the
transition function Tq is quadratic, and the ﬁlter Fl is linear.
We denote by x the initial state of the generator: it is a binary vector of size equal to the
number of the unknown values of the registers. The algebraic attack consists in the determination
of x from the equations F(T i(x)) = si, where the si are the successive observed bits output by
the generator.
If we look at the LFSR case, we obtain the following system:
Fnl(T i
l (x)) = si. Each equation have the same degree which is the degree of the ﬁlter Fnl. All
the resistance of algebraic attack is based on the choice of Fnl. It is a boolean function with a
relatively small number of monomials.
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In the FCSR case, the system becomes:
Fl(T i
q(x)) = si. The degree of the i-th equation is the degree of T i
q. The ﬁrst equation is linear, the
second quadratic, the third of degree at least 3 and so on. Even if the ﬁrst equations are simpler,
the degree and the number of monomials in each equation increases. It becomes computationally
infeasible to obtain the equations.
Note that if the content of the carry register is not known, our system have k + l unknowns.
If the carry register is initialized to 0, we have a reduced system. The algebraic attack is then
harder if the ﬁrsts bits output remain unknown to the attacker.
For example, let us consider the FCSR automaton associated to the divisor q = −13. In this
case, k = 3. The transition function is then:
Trans((m0,m1,m2),(c0,c1)) =
((m1 ⊕ m0 ⊕ c0,m2 ⊕ m0 ⊕ c1,m0),(c0m0 ⊕ c0m1 ⊕ m0m1,c2m0 ⊕ c2m2 ⊕ m0m2)).
The equations we obtain are
m0 = m0(0),
m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ c0 = m0(1),
m0m1 ⊕ m0c0 ⊕ m1c0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m2 ⊕ c0 = m0(2),
c0c1 ⊕ c1 ⊕ m0m1m2 ⊕ m0m1 ⊕ m1m2 ⊕ m0 ⊕ m2 = m0(3),
m0m1m2 ⊕ m0m1c1 ⊕ m0m1 ⊕ m0m2c0 ⊕ m0c0c1 ⊕ m0c0 ⊕ m0 ⊕ m1m2c0 ⊕ m1m2 ⊕ m1c0 ⊕
m1c1 ⊕ m1c1 ⊕ m2c0 ⊕ m2c1 ⊕ m2 ⊕ c0c1 ⊕ c1 = m0(4),
and so on.
For i greater than 5 the degree of fi(m0,m1,m2,c0,c1) is 4 or 5.
Note that in this example, k = 3,l = 2 and then the maximum degree of the equations is 5.
In the general case the equations obtained (except for the ﬁrst ones) are of large degree. (In fact
half of them are of degree k+l and most of the others of degree k+l−1.) For a cryptographic
use, k should be about 128 (and l about 64).
If we assume as above that the initial content of the carry register is 0, the equations obtained
are simpler and this can help to give some information about the mi(0) to the attacker.
Clearly, the system is of a special form, since the ﬁrst equation is linear, the second quadratic
and so on. Perhaps, it is possible to design a speciﬁc attack using th dynamic property of each
iteration. A solution will be to guess at some iterations t the value m0(t) used in the computation
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of carries. This knowledge stops in some case the increase of the degree.
For example, if we guess n values m0(j) for j = 0 to n − 1, our system becomes equivalent
with another iterative system with k − n unknowns and some equations of small degree. This
method looks like to an exhaustive search on the possible values m0(j), for j ≤ k.
CONCLUSION
We proposed a fast random generator, easy to implement especially in hardware (but also in
software). It has good statistical properties and it is resistant to all known attacks. Its design
can be compared to older generators (such as the summation generator [20]) where the core has
a linear structure, broken by a 2-adic device. Our generator has a core with a 2-adic structure
which is broken by a linear ﬁlter. Our generator might be of similar interest of these older
generators (the summation generator is one of the best generator known) while being even easy
to implement by the simplicity of the ﬁlter.
Acknowledgments: Both authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful
comments, remarks and suggestions.
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Abstract
In this paper we present a new class of stream ciphers based on a very simple mechanism.
The heart of our method is a Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSR) automaton. This
automaton is very similar to the classical LFSR generators, except the fact that it performs
operations with carries. Its properties are well mastered: proved period, non-degenerated
states, good statistical properties, high non-linearity.
The only problem to use such an automaton directly is the fact that the mathematical
structure (2-adic fraction) can be retrieved from few bits of its output using an analog of the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm.
To mask this structure, we propose to use a ﬁlter on the cells of the FCSR automaton. Due
to the high non-linearity of this automaton, the best ﬁlter is simply a linear ﬁlter, that is a
XOR on some internal states. We call such a generator a Filtered FCSR (F-FCSR) generator.
We propose four versions of our generator: the ﬁrst uses a static ﬁlter with a single output
at each iteration of the generator (F-FCSR-SF1). A second with an 8 bit output (F-FCSR-
SF8). The third and the fourth are similar, but use a dynamic ﬁlter depending on the key
(F-FCSR-DF1 and F-FCSR-DF8). We give limitations on the use of the static ﬁlter versions,
in scope of the time/memory/data tradeoﬀ attack.
These stream ciphers are very fast and eﬃcient, especially for hardware implementations.
Keywords: stream cipher, pseudorandom generator, feedback with carry shift register, 2-adic
fractions.
1 Introduction
Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) are the most popular tool used to design fast pseudoran-
dom generators. Their properties are well known, among them the fact that the structure of an
LFSR can be easily recovered from his output by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. Many methods
have been used to thwart the Berlekamp-Massey attack because the high speed and simplicity of
LFSRs are important beneﬁts.
Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSR) were introduced by M. Goresky and A. Klapper
in [7]. They are very similar to classical Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) used in many
pseudorandom generators. The main diﬀerence is the fact that the elementary additions are not
additions modulo 2 but with propagation of carries. This generator is almost as simple and as fast
as a LFSR generator. The mathematical model for FCSR is the one of rational 2-adic numbers
(cf. [9, 10]). This model leads to proved results on period and non degeneration of internal states
of the generator. It inherits the good statistical properties of LFSR sequences.Unfortunately, as for the LFSR case, it is possible to recover the structure of a sequence
generated by an FCSR (cf. [8, 2],[1]). To avoid this problem, we propose to use a ﬁlter on the
cells of the FCSR automaton. Since this automaton has good non linear properties, the ﬁlter is
simply a linear function, i.e. a XOR on some cells. This method is very eﬃcient for practical
implementations.
First we describe the FCSR automaton and recall the properties of its output. For applications,
we propose an automaton with a key of 128 bits in the main register.
Then we present the diﬀerent versions of our generator with a detailed security analysis in
each case. For the F-FCSR-SF1 version, we show that the algebraic attack is not possible and we
describe some dedicated attacks. For the proposed parameters, this attack is more expensive than
the exhaustive one. The main restriction to the use of this version is the fact that the cost of the
time/memory/data tradeoﬀs attack is O(298), which is less than the exhaustive attack.
With the F-FCSR-SF8 version, we explain how our automaton can be ﬁltered in order to
obtain an 8-bit output at each iteration. The problem on designing a good ﬁlter in that situation
is discussed. This leads to some problems on its design. This is why we recommend to use the
F-FCSR-DF8 version of our generator to perform a 8-bit output system with high level of security.
In the dynamic ﬁlter versions of our generator, we substitute to the static ﬁlter a dynamic
one, i.e. depending on the secret initialization key. This method increases the cost of the
time/memory/data tradeoﬀs attack. This cost becomes O(2162) for a 128-bit key. Moreover this
dynamic ﬁlter avoids all 2-adic and algebraic attacks. In particular for the 8-bit output version, it
avoids some attacks on ﬁlter combinations. For practical applications, we propose to use the S-box
of Rijndael in order to construct the dynamic ﬁlter. This method is very eﬃcient, and generally,
this box is already implemented.
In the last section, we explain how it is possible to use our generators as stream ciphers with IV
mode of size 64 bits. The 128-bit key is used to initialize the main register, and the initial vector
is used to initialize the carries register. For some dedicated applications, we also propose to use a
key of 96 bits with an IV of 64 bits.
2 The FCSR automaton
We ﬁrst recall the properties of an FCSR automaton used to construct our pseudorandom gener-
ators: an FCSR automaton performs the division of two integers following the increasing powers
of 2 in their binary decompositions. This mechanism is directly related to the theory of 2-adic
fractions. For more theoretical approach, the reader could refer to [11, 7].
The main results used here are the following:
• Any periodic binary sequence can be expressed as a 2-adic fraction p/q, where q is a negative
odd integer and 0 ≤ p < |q|.
• Conversely, if a periodic binary sequence is generated from a 2-adic fraction p/q, then the
period of this sequence is known and is exactly the order of 2 modulo q.
• It is easy to choose a prime number q such as the order of 2 is exactly T = |q| − 1, and
therefore the period generated by any initial value 0 < p < |q| is exactly T. So, in the rest
of this paper, we suppose that q is such that 2128 < |q| < 2129 and that the condition on the
order of 2 is always satisﬁed in order to guarantee a period greater than 2128.
• If p and q are integers of ”small size”, i.e. 128 bits for p and 129 bits for q, the sequences p/q
looks like random sequences of period T in terms of linear complexity (but it remains false
for its 2-adic complexity (i.e. the size of q)).
2¿From now, we suppose that the FCSR studied in this section veriﬁes the following conditions:
q < 0 ≤ p, p < −q, p =
Pk−1
i=0 pi2i, q = 1 − 2d and d =
Pk−1
i=0 di2i.
p will be the initial (secret) state of the automaton whereas q will be the equivalent of the
”feedback polynomial” of a classical LFSR.
2.1 Modelization of the automaton
If q is deﬁned as above, the FCSR generator with feedback prime q can be described as a circuit
containing two registers:
• The main register M with k binary memories (one for each cell), where k is the bitlength
of d, that is 2k−1 ≤ d < 2k.
• The carry register C with ` binary memories (one for each cell with a  at its left) where
` + 1 is the Hamming weight of d. Using the binary expansion
Pk−1
i=0 di2i of d, we put
Id = {i | 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and di = 1}. So ` = #Id. We also put d∗ = d − 2k−1.
We will say that the main register contains the integer m =
Pk−1
i=0 mi2i when it contains the
binary values (m0,...,mk−1). The content m of the main register always satisﬁes 0 ≤ m ≤ 2k −1.
In order to use similar notation for the carry register, we can think of it as a k bit register where
the k − l bits of rank not in Id are always 0. The content c =
P
i∈Id ci2i of the carry register
always satisﬁes 0 ≤ c ≤ d∗.
Example 1 Let q = −347, so d = 174 = 0xAE, k = 8 and ` = 4. The following diagram shows
these two registers:
m(t) m7 m6 m5 m4 m3 m2 m1 m0 - - - - - - - - -    
6 6 6 6
c(t) 0 0 c5 0 c3 c2 c1 0
? ? ? ? 6 6 6 6
d 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
where  denotes the addition with carry, i.e., it corresponds to the following scheme in hardware:
ci
 
H H
- a
- b
- c(t−1)
- s=a⊕b⊕c(t−1)
c(t)=ab⊕ac(t−1)⊕bc(t−1)

Transition function
As described above, the FCSR circuit with feedback prime q is an automaton with 2k+l states
corresponding to the k + l binary memories of main and carry registers. We say that the FCSR
circuit is in state (m,c) if the main and carry registers contain respectively the binary expansion
of m and of c.
Suppose that at time t, the FCSR circuit is in state (m(t),c(t)) with m =
Pk−1
i=0 mi(t)2i and
c =
Pk−1
i=0 ci(t)2i. The state (m(t + 1),c(t + 1)) at time t + 1 is computed using:
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and i / ∈ Id
mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t)
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and i ∈ Id
3mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t) ⊕ ci(t) ⊕ m0(t)
ci(t + 1) := mi+1(t)ci(t) ⊕ ci(t)m0(t) ⊕ m0(t)mi+1(t)
• For the case i = k − 1
mk−1(t + 1) := m0(t).
Note that this transition function is described with (at most) quadratic boolean functions and
that for all three cases mi(t + 1) and ci(t + 1) can be expressed with a single formula:
mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t) ⊕ dici(t) ⊕ dim0(t)
ci(t + 1) := mi+1(t)ci(t) ⊕ ci(t)m0(t) ⊕ m0(t)mi+1(t)
if we put mk(t) = 0 and ci(t) = 0 for i not in Id.
We now study the sequences of values taken by the binary memories of the main register, that
is the sequences Mi = (mi(t))t∈N, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
The main result is the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Consider the FCSR automaton with (negative) feedback prime q = 1 − 2d. Let k be
the bitlength of d. Then, for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, there exists an integer pi such that Mi
is the 2-adic expansion of pi/q. More precisely, these values pi can be easily computed from the
initial states mi(0) and ci(0) using the recursive following formulas:
pi =

qmi(0) + 2pi+1 if di = 0
q
 
mi(0) + 2ci(0)

+ 2(pi+1 + p0) if di = 1.
If we consider a prime divisor q such that the period is exactly T = (|q| − 1)/2, the sequences
Mi are distinct shifts of a same sequence (e.g. 1/q), but each shift amount depends on the initial
values of the main register and the carry register, and looks like random shifts on a sequence of
period T (remember that, for applications T ' 2128).
2.2 Hardware and software performances of the FCSR
2.2.1 Hardware realization
As we have just seen before, we could directly implement in hardware the structure of an FCSR
using a Galois architecture. Even if the needed number of gates is greater, the speed of such a
structure is equivalent to the one of an LFSR.
2.2.2 Software aspects
The transition function can also be described in pseudocode with the following global presentation
expressing integers m(t),c(t) instead of bits mi(t),ci(t) more suitable for software implementations.
If ⊕ denotes bitwise addition without carries, ⊗ denotes bitwise and, shift+ the shift of one
bit on the right, i.e. shift+(m) = bm(t)/2c and par is the parity of a number m (1 if m is odd, 0
if it is even):
m(t + 1) := shift+(m(t)) ⊕ c(t) ⊕ par(m)d
c(t + 1) := shift+(m(t)) ⊗ c(t) ⊕ c(t) ⊗ par(m)d ⊕ par(m)d ⊗ shift+(m(t))
And the pseudoalgorithm could be written as:
b := par(m) (boolean)
a := shift+(m)
m := a ⊕ c
4c := a ⊗ c
if b = 1 then
c := c ⊕ (m ⊗ d)
m := m ⊕ d
end if
The number of cycles needed to implement the FCSR in software seems to be twice greater
than the one required for an LFSR but as we will see in the following section, due to the very
simplicity of our ﬁltering function, the general speed in software of our Filtering FCSR might be
more eﬃcient than usual LFSR based generators.
2.2.3 Parameters of the FCSR automaton for designing the stream ciphers
For a cryptographic use with a security greater than 2128, we recommend the use of a negative
retroaction prime −q, corresponding to k = 128. This implies that 2128 < |q| < 2129 − 1.
In order to maximize the period of the generated sequence, the order of 2 modulo q must be
maximal i.e. equals to |q| − 1. Moreover, to avoid some potential particular cases, we propose to
choose a prime q such that (|q| − 1)/2 is also a prime.
The FCSR retroaction prime must be public. We propose
−q = 493877400643443608888382048200783943827 (1)
= 0x1738D53D56FC4BFAD3D0C6D3430ADD893
The binary expansion of d = (|q| + 1)/2 is
1011100111000110101010011110101010110111111000100101111111010110
1001111010000110001101101001101000011000010101101110110001001010.
Its Hamming weight is 69 and then there are ` = 68 carry cells (the Hamming weight of d∗ =
d − 2128) and k = 128 cells in the main register.
3 Design of F-FCSR : Filtered FCSR automaton with a
static ﬁlter
As for the LFSRs, a binary sequence generated by a single FCSR can not be used directly to
produce a pseudorandom sequence (even if the output bits have good statistical properties and
high linear complexity), since the initial state and the 2-adic structure can be recovered using a
variant of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [8, 2]. So, we propose in this section to ﬁlter the output
of an FCSR with two appropriate static functions and we prove the eﬃciency and the resistance
against known attacks of those two constructions.
3.1 The F-FCSR-SF1 : one output bit
How to ﬁlter an FCSR automaton?
For the LFSR case many tools have been developed to mask the structure of the generator, by using
boolean functions with suitable properties (see for example [12, 4]) to combine several LFSRs, by
using combiners with memory or by shrinking the sequence produced by an LFSR.
It is possible to use similar methods with an FCSR generator, but with a very important
diﬀerence: since an FCSR generator looks like a random generator for the non linear properties,
it is not necessary to use a ﬁlter function with high non linearity.
Then the best functions for ﬁltering an FCSR generator are linear functions:
f : GF(2)n → GF(2), f(x1,...,xn) =
Ln
i=1 fixi, fi ∈ GF(2).
5As studied previously, the sequence Mi observed on the i-th dividend register is a 2-adic fraction,
with known period, good statistical properties and looks like a random sequence except from the
point of view of 2-adic complexity.
The sequences Ci (with i ∈ I∗
d) produced by the carry register are not so good from a statistical
point of view: these sequences are probably balanced, however, if a carry register is in the state
1 (resp. 0), it remains in the same state 1 (resp. 0) with a probability 3/4 since each of the two
other entries of the corresponding addition box corresponds to 2-adic fractions and produces a 1
with a probability approximatively 1/2. It is suﬃcient to have only one more 1 to produce a 1 in
the carry register.
These remarks lead to ﬁlter only on the k cells mi(t) of the main register, not on the cells of
the carry register.
To modelize our linear ﬁlter, we consider a binary vector F = (f0,...,fk−1) of length k.
The output sequence of our ﬁltered FCSR is then
S = (s(t))t∈N, where s(t) =
k M
i=1
fi · mi(t).
The extraction of the output from the content of the main register M and the ﬁlter F can be
done using the following algorithm:
S := M ⊗ F
for i := 6 to 0 do
S := S ⊕ shift+2i(S)
Output: par(S)
It needs 7 shifts, 7 Xor and 1 And on 128-bit integers. So, the proposed F-FCSR is very eﬃcient
in hardware.
Design of the static ﬁlter for the F-FCSR-SF1 stream cipher
Let kF be the integer such that 2kF ≤ F < 2kF+1. We will see in Paragraph 3.2.1 that it is possible
to develop an attack on the initial key which needs 4kF trials.
If F is a power of 2, the output is a 2-adic sequence and is not resistant to 2-adic attacks.
Moreover, if F is known, and its binary expansion contains few 1, the ﬁrst equations of the algebraic
attack are simpler, even if it is not possible to develop such an attack (cf. Paragraph 3.2.3).
A ﬁrst natural solution would be to choose F = 2128 − 1, that is to xor all the cells of the
main register. In this case, suppose that the output is S = (s(t))t∈N. It is easy to check that the
sequence S0 = (s(t) + s(t + 1))t∈N is the same that the one that would be obtained by xoring all
the carry cells. Even if we do not know how to use this fact to develop a cryptanalysis, we prefer
to use another ﬁlter for this reason.
In our application, we propose to choose F = d = (|q| + 1)/2. With this ﬁlter, the output is
the XOR of all cells of the main register which are just at the right of a carry cell. For the prime q
proposed above in (1) the value of kF is 128 and the Hamming weight of the ﬁlter is 69.
We propose a very simple initialization of the F-FCSR-SF1 generator: we choose a key K
with 128 bits. The key K is used directly to initialize the main register M. The carry register is
initialized at 0.
Statistical properties of the ﬁltered output
When two or more sequences are xored, the resulting sequence has good statistical properties as
soon as one of the sequences is good, under the restriction that this sequence is not correlated with
the other.
6In our generator, each sequence is a 2-adic fraction with denominator q and has good statistical
properties. The only problem is the fact that these sequences are not independent, since they are
obtained by distinct shifts of the same periodic sequence. Note that the period of the sequence
is very large (T ≥ 2127), and that a priori the 69 distinct shifts looks like random shifts. So the
output sequence will have good statistical properties.
This hypothesis is comforted by the fact that our generator passes the NIST statistical test
suite, as we checked.
3.2 Cryptanalysis of F-FCSR-SF1
3.2.1 2-adic cryptanalysis of F-FCSR-SF1
2-adic complexity of the XOR of two or more 2-adic integers
A priori, the XOR is not related with 2-adic operations (i.e. operations with carries), and then
the sequence obtained by XORing two 2-adic fractions looks like a random sequence from the point
of view of 2-adic complexity. Experiments support this assumption.
Moreover, due to the choice of q, in particular to the fact that (|q|−1)/2 is prime, the probability
to have a high 2-adic complexity is greater than in the general case.
Let q be a negative prime such that 2 is of order |q| − 1 modulo q. Consider the xor (p1/q) ⊕
(p2/q) of the 2-adic expansions of two fractions with q as denominator and 0 < p1,p2 < |q|. By
Theorem 2, both summands are a sequence of period |q| − 1 so the xor is also a sequence of
period |q| − 1 (or dividing it). Can this latter sequence written also as a fraction p/q? (with
0 ≤ p ≤ q and possibly non reduced). Surely, the answer is yes in some cases (e.g. if p1 = p2).
But in very most cases, the answer is no. Here is an heuristic argument to show this under the
assumption that such an xor gives a random sequence of period dividing |q| − 1. The number
of such sequences is 2|q|−1 and the number of sequences of the form (p1/q) ⊕ (p2/q) is at most
(|q| − 1)2/2. So we can expect that the probability that the xor can be written p/q is about
|q|2/2|q| which is very small. This remark extends to the xor of O(ln|q|) summands.
A 2-adic attack
Theorem 2 Assume that the ﬁlter F is known by the attacker and let kF be an integer such that
F < 2kF+1 (that is all cells selected by the ﬁlter belong to the rightmost kF + 1 cells of the main
register). Then the attacker can discover the key of the generator at a cost O(k22kF).
We ﬁrst state a lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume that the attacker knows the initial values mi(0) for 0 ≤ i < kF (he also knows
the initial values ci(0) for 0 ≤ i < kF which were assumed to be 0). Then he can compute the T
ﬁrst bits mkF(t) (for 0 ≤ t < T) of the sequence MkF by observing the sequence outputted by the
generator, in time O(TkF).
Proof : The attacker observes ﬁrst S(0) =
LkF
i=0 fimi(0). In this equality, the only unknown
value is mkF(0) so the attacker can compute it in time O(kF). For subsequent bits the method
generalizes as follows.
Assume that the attacker has computed bits mkF(t) for 0 ≤ t < τ and knows mi(t) and ci(t)
for 0 ≤ t < τ and 0 ≤ i < kF. Observing the bit S(τ) he gets
S(τ) =
kF M
i=0
fimi(τ)
7and the only unknown value here is mkF(τ). So the attacker obtains it, also in time O(kF). He
can also compute mi(τ + 1) and ci(τ + 1) for 0 ≤ i < kF, using the transition function. The time
needed to compute these 2kF bits is also O(kF). We obtain the result by induction. 
The attack whose existence is asserted in Theorem 2 works following six steps.
• Choose an arbitrary new set of values for the bits mi(0) for 0 ≤ i < kF and put ci(0) = 0 for
0 ≤ i < kF.
• Assuming that these bits correspond to the chosen values, compute the ﬁrst k bits of the
sequence MkF.
• Using the transition function, compute the ﬁrst k + kF bits of the sequence M0 from the
assumed values for the bits mi(0) with 0 ≤ i < kF and the k bits obtained in the previous
step.
• Multiply the integer
Pk−1
t=0 m0(t)2t by q modulo 2k to obtain a candidate p0 for the key.
• Run a simulation of the generator with the key p0. Stop it after generating k + kF bits.
Compare the last kF bits obtained to the ones computed in Step 3. If they don’t agree, the
candidate found is not the true key. Return to ﬁrst step until all possibilities are exhausted.
• After all possibilities in Step 1 are exhausted, use some more bits of the generator to determine
which key is the true key, if more than one good candidate remains.
Now the proof of the theorem:
Proof : From Lemma 1, the cost of Step 2 is in O(kkF) ≤ O(k2). Step 3 has also a cost of O(kkF).
The cost of Step 4 is O(k2) and those of Step 5 is O(k(k + kF)) ≤ O(k2). The loop deﬁned by
Step 1 has to be iterated O(2kF) times. Multiplying the number of iterations by the inner cost
gives the cost of the whole attack. 
With our parameters k = 128 and kF = 127, this attack is more expensive than the exhaustive
attack on the key.
Moreover, if the carries are not initialized to 0, there are 196 unknowns in the system instead
of 128.
3.2.2 Linear complexity of F-FCSR-SF1 generator: XOR of two or more 2-adic in-
tegers
Arguments for the linear complexity are similar to those yet presented for the 2-adic complexity:
since each 2-adic fraction looks like a random sequence from the point of view of linear complexity,
the XOR of these sequences have a high linear complexity (cf. [17]). Experiments also support
this assumption.
As for the 2-adic case, the particular value chosen for the period T helps for the 2-adic complex-
ity to be high. Let q be a negative prime such that 2 is of order |q|−1 modulo q. Consider the xor
(p1/q) ⊕ (p2/q) of the 2-adic expansion of two fractions with q as denominator, and numerators
such that 0 < p1,p2 < |q|. Similar arguments as those above about the 2-adic behavior of this xor
applies to its linear behavior.
If this xor corresponds to the expansion of a series P(X)/Q(X) (written as a fraction in
reduced form), then the order of the polynomial Q must be a divisor of T = |q|−1. With the value
of q proposed in (1), the order of Q must be 1, 2, T, or T/2. The only polynomials of order 1 or 2
are the powers of (X + 1). Polynomials of order T or T/2 must have an irreducible factor Q1 of
8order T or T/2. But this order must be a divisor of 2deg(Q1) − 1, so deg(Q1) is a multiple of the
order of 2 modulo q. In the case of the above value of q, this order is T/2, a number of bitsize 127.
Hence polynomials Q with a divisor of such a degree are not so frequent.
3.2.3 Algebraic cryptanalysis of F-FCSR-SF1
The algebraic cryptanalysis of a pseudorandom generator is a tool developed recently (cf.[5]).
The principle is simple: we consider the bits of the initial state m = (m0,...,mk−1) =
(m0(0)...,mk−1(0)) as the set of unknowns (suppose ﬁrst that the initial value of the carry regis-
ter is 0) and, using the transition function, we compute the successive outputs of the generator as
functions of these unknowns fi(m0,...,mk−1). If the attacker knows the ﬁrst output bits of the
generator, he gets a system of (non linear) equations in k variables. We can add to this system the
equations m2
i = mi as the unknowns are Booleans. If the system obtained is not too complicated,
it can be solved using for example the Gr¨ obner basis methods [6].
The transition function of an FCSR automaton is quadratic: the ﬁrst equation is linear on 128
variables (or 196 variables if the carries are not initialized to 0), the second one is quadratic, the
third is of degree 3, and so on. For example, the eleventh equation is of degree 11 in 128 variables,
its size is about 250 monomials and is not computable. To solve the algebraic system, we need at
least 128 equations.
Note that the fact we use a known ﬁlter does not increase the diﬃculty of this attack. The
ﬁlter is just a ﬁrewall against a 2-adic cryptanalysis.
3.2.4 The time/memory/data tradeoﬀ attack
There exists a recent attack on stream ciphers with inner states: the time/memory/data tradeoﬀ
attack [3]. The cost of this attack is O(2n/2), where n is the number of inner states of the
stream cipher. This cost reﬂects not only the time needed for the attack, but also the use of
memory and the amount of data required. For the F-FCSR-SF1, the number of inner states is
n = k + ` = 128 + 68 = 196. Even if this attack remains impracticable, it is faster than the
exhaustive one. This is why we recommend to use the dynamic ﬁlter method.
3.3 Design of F-FCSR-SF8: a static ﬁlter and an 8-bit output
In order to increase the speed of the generator, we propose to use several ﬁlters to get several bits
at each transition of the FCSR automaton. For example, using 8 distinct ﬁlters, it is possible to
obtain an 8-bit output at each transition. However, the design of several ﬁlters may be diﬃcult.
A ﬁrst cryptanalysis on multiple ﬁlters
Suppose that we use 8 ﬁlters F1, ..., F8 on the same state of main register M. Obviously, each of
these ﬁlters must be resistant to the 2-adic attack. These 8 ﬁlters must be linearly independent to
avoid a linear dependency on the 8 outputs. Moreover, by linear combinations of the 8 ﬁlters, it is
possible to obtain 28 ﬁlters, each of them must also be resistant to the 2-adic attack.
Let C be the binary linear code generated by F1, ..., F8.
• The condition on the independence of the 8 ﬁlters is the fact that the dimension of C is
exactly 8.
• For F ∈ C, let kF be the least integer such that 2kF > F (here F is viewed as an inte-
ger). The minimum over C of the values of kF must be as larger as possible. Note that
minF∈C,F6=0{kF} ≤ k − 8 = 120. If we choose C such that minF∈C,F6=0{kF} = 120, the
9cost of the 2-adic attack is O(120×2120) which is approximatively the cost of the exhaustive
attack.
Note that it is easy to construct a code C satisfying this condition.
• We recommend to avoid the use of a code C with a small minimum distance d. Indeed, from
a codeword of weight d, it is possible to construct a ﬁlter on d cells of the main register M.
Even if we do not know how to design such an attack for d ≥ 2, we suggest to choose C
satisfying d ≥ 6.
A simple way to construct 8 simultaneous ﬁlters
In order to construct good ﬁlters with a very eﬃcient method to extract the 8-bit output, we
recommend the following method:
The ﬁlters are chosen with supports included in distinct sets. More precisely, for i = 0 to 7,
Supp(Fi) ⊂ {j | j ≡ i (mod 8)}.
This construction ensures dim(C) = 8, minF∈C,F6=0{kF} = mini{kFi} and d = mini(w(Fi)),
where w(F) is the Hamming weight of F. Moreover the extraction procedure becomes very simple:
First, set F =
L7
i=0 Fi. The extraction of the 8-bit output from the content of the main register
M and the ﬁlter F can be done using the following algorithm:
S := M ⊗ F
for i := 6 to 3 do
S := S ⊕ shift+2i(S)
Output: S ⊗ 255 (the 8 lower weight bits of S)
This needs 4 shifts, 4 Xor and 2 And on 128-bit integers. This extraction is faster than the
extraction of a single bit.
Note that conversely, from a 128-bit ﬁlter F, we obtain a family of 8-bit ﬁlters. As an example,
for the value F = d proposed for the F-FCSR-SF1 generator, we obtain a code C with dim(C) = 8,
minkF = 113 and d = 4. For this choice of ﬁlter, it will be possible to design a 2-adic attack
slightly more eﬃcient than the exhaustive one.
A possible attack
Let S(t) = (S0(t),...,S7(t)) be the 8-bit output at time t. Some entries selected by the ﬁlter on
which depend S0(t + 7), S1(t + 6),..., S7(t) may be related. And the relations involved might be
partially explicited when the state of the automaton is partially known.
So, even if we do not know how to design such an attack, we do not advice to use the 8-bit
output generator with a static ﬁlter. The dynamic ﬁlter method presented in the next section will
resist to such attack and will be preferred. We also propose to use an IV mode with the F-FCSR
designs in order to have a high conﬁdence on the security against be sure to resist to the diﬀerent
attacks.
4 Design of F-FCSR-DF1 and F-FCSR-DF8: dynamic ﬁl-
tered FCSR stream ciphers
Due to the fact that the ﬁlter is very simple and its quality is easy to check, it is possible to use
a dynamic ﬁlter: the ﬁlter can be constructed as a function of the key K, and then, is not known
by the attacker. As soon as the ﬁlter is not trivial (F 6= 0 and F 6= 2i), it is not possible to use
the algebraic attack, nor the attack exploiting the small binary size of F.
10The construction of this dynamic ﬁltered FCSR generator (DF-FCSR generator) is very simple:
let g be a bijective map of GF(2)128 onto itself. For a 128-bit key K, we construct the ﬁlter
F = g(K) and also we use the key to initialize the main register. The carry register is initialized
at 0, since the attacker cannot ﬁnd the equations for the algebraic attack.
The main interest of the use of a dynamic ﬁlter is the fact that the number n of inner state is
increased of the size of the ﬁlter, i.e. n = 2k` = 324. The cost of the time/memory/data tradeoﬀs
attack becomes higher than those of the exhaustive one.
4.1 Design of F-FCSR-DF1
This stream cipher is identical to F-FCSR-SF1 except the fact that the ﬁlter is dynamic.
We propose to use for g the Rijndael S-box (cf. [14, 15]). This S-box operates on bytes, and
using it for each 16 bytes of a 128-bit key, we get a suitable function g.
It is suitable to add a quality test for the ﬁlter, for example by testing the binary size kF of
F and its Hamming weight w(F). For example, if kF < 100 or w(F) < 40, then we iterate g to
obtain another ﬁlter with good quality.
The computation of this dynamic ﬁlter is very simple. The main advantages are to thwart com-
pletely the 2-adic attack (§3.2.1), the algebraic attack (§3.2.3) and to avoid the time/memory/data
tradeoﬀ attack.
However, until now, we do not ﬁnd any attack faster than the exhaustive search against the
static ﬁlter generator.
4.2 Design of F-FCSR-DF8
For the 8-bit output version, the use of a dynamic ﬁlter has also other justiﬁcation: it avoids all
possible attacks on the ﬁlter described in Paragraph 3.3.
For a practical use we recommend the following key loading procedure:
• Construction of the ﬁlter F from the 128-bit secret key K by applying the Rijndael S-box.
• Test the quality of the 8 subﬁlters extracted from F. Each of them must have an Hamming
weight at least 6, and a binary size at least 100.
• Go to the ﬁrst step until the test succeed.
• Use the key K to initialize the main register M. The carry register is initialized to 0.
The ﬁlter procedure is those of F-FCSR-SF8 (§3.3).
4.3 An initial vector mode for F-FCSR stream ciphers
The IV mode
There are several possibilities to add some initial vector IV to our generators. A ﬁrst one will be
to use it as ﬁlter F, where the main register is initialized with the key K and the carry register is
initialized to 0.
In that case, we are in the situation of multiple known ﬁlters on the same initialization of the
automaton. This method will be dangerous.
In fact, the good solution is to use always the same ﬁlter from a ﬁxed key K with a static ﬁlter
for 1 bit output and dynamic ﬁlter for 8-bit output. The IV is used to initialize the carry registers.
With our automaton, there are 68 bits in the carry register. It is easy to use them for IV of size
64. In order to avoid some problems related to the use of the same key K for the main register, we
recommend to wait 6 cycles of the automaton before using an input after a change of IV . After
these 6 cycles, every cell of the main register contains a value depending not only of K but also of
IV .
11We recommend to use the following protocol either with the F-FCSR-DF1 stream cipher, or
with the F-FCSR-DF8 stream cipher:
Pseudocode:
1. F := g(K) (dynamic construction of the ﬁlter).
2. M := K; M := K.
3. Clock 6 times the FCSR and discard the output.
4. Clock and ﬁlter the FCSR until the next change of IV .
5. If change of IV , return to step 2.
A variant of our generator with a key of size 96 and initial vector of size 64
For some purposes where the security is important only during a limited amount of time, it can
be useful to deﬁne a variant with a smaller key-size (but with same IV-size). For that we propose
to use the retroaction prime
q = −145992282562012510535118773123 = −0x1D7B9FC57FE19AFEFEF7C5B83
This prime has been selected according the following criteria. Its bit size is 97, so that d has
bitsize 96. Also (|q| − 1)/2 is prime. The order of 2 modulo |q| − 1 is exactly |q| − 1. And
d = 0xEBDCFE2BFF0CD7F7F7BE2DC2 has weight 65 so that there are 64 useful cells in the
carries register.
Conclusion
We proposed a very fast pseudorandom generator, easy to implement especially in hardware (but
also in software). It has good statistical properties and it is resistant to all known attacks. Its
design can be compared to older generators (such as the summation generator [16]) for whose the
heart has a linear structure, and is broken by a 2-adic device. Instead, our generator has a heart
with a 2-adic structure which is destroyed by a linear ﬁlter. It might be of similar interest of these
older generators (the summation generator is one of the best generator known) while being even
easier to implement due to the simplicity of the ﬁlter.
Acknowledgments: Both authors would like to thank Anne Canteaut and Marine Minier for
helpful comments and suggestions.
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13Design of new pseudo random generators based on a ﬁltered
FCSR automaton
F. Arnault, T.P. Berger ∗
Abstract
Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSR) were introduced by M. Goresky and A.
Klapper in 1993. They are very similar to classical Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR)
used in many pseudorandom generators. The main diﬀerence is the fact that the elementary
additions are not additions modulo 2 but with propagation of carries.
In this paper we propose a new generator designed from a FCSR automaton with known
prime divisor. The FCSR structure is hidden by a ﬁlter on the cells of the FCSR automaton.
Since this automaton has good non linear properties, the ﬁlter is simply a linear function,
i.e. a XOR on some cells.
We present two versions of our generator: the ﬁrst one uses a static ﬁlter, the second one
a dynamic ﬁlter produced by the key and the S-boxes of Rijndael.
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) are the most used tool used to design fast random
generators. Their properties are well known, among them the fact that the structure of a plain
LFSR can be easily recovered from his output by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. Many
methods have been used to thwart the Berlekamp-Massey attack because the high speed and
simplicity of LFSRs are important beneﬁts.
Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSR) were introduced by M. Goresky and A. Klapper
in [7]. They are very similar to classical Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) used in many
pseudorandom generators. The main diﬀerence is the fact that the elementary additions are not
additions modulo 2 but with propagation of carries.
The mathematical models for LFSR are equivalently linear recurring sequences over GF(2)
or rational series in the set GF(2)[[x]]. For FCSR, the “good” model is the one of rational 2-adic
numbers (cf. [9, 10]).
As for the LFSR case, it is possible to recover the structure of a sequence generated by a
FCSR (cf. [8, 4]). To avoid this problem, we propose to use a ﬁlter on the cells of the FCSR
automaton. Since this automaton has good non-linear properties, the ﬁlter is simply a linear
function, i.e. a XOR on some cells.
The ﬁrst section of this paper is devoted to the background about the link between eventually
periodic binary sequences and 2-adic numbers. We recall the notion of 2-adic complexity and
the generation of such sequences using shift registers and Galois architecture [10, 3].
The second section contains an extensive study of the FCSR automaton in its Galois version.
The design and analysis of the new generator with a ﬁxed ﬁlter is presented in the third
section.
∗LACO, Universit´ e de Limoges, 123 avenue A. Thomas, 87060 Limoges CEDEX, France
Email : arnault@unilim.fr thierry.berger@unilim.frFinally, in the fourth section, we explain that it is easy to replace the static ﬁlter by a
dynamic ﬁlter using for example the S-boxes of Rijndael.
1 The 2-adic FCSR architectures for eventually periodic binary
sequences
1.1 Representation of eventually periodic binary
sequences with 2-adic numbers
First, we will recall brieﬂy some basic properties of 2-adic numbers. For more theoretical ap-
proach the reader can refer to [11].
A 2-adic integer is formally a power series s =
P∞
n=0 sn2n, sn ∈ {0,1}. Clearly, such a
series does not always converge in the classical sense, however, it can be considered as a formal
object. Actually, this series always converges if we consider the 2-adic topology. The set of
2-adic integers is denoted by Z2.
The addition and multiplication in Z2 can be performed by reporting the carries to the higher
order term, i.e. 2n + 2n = 2n+1 for all n ∈ N.
If there exists an integer N such that sn = 0 for all n ≥ N, then s is a positive integer.
An important remark is the fact that −1 =
P∞
n=0 2n, which is easy to verify by computing
1 +
P∞
n=0 2n = 0. This fact allows us to compute the negative of a 2-adic integer very easily: if
s = 2n +
P∞
i=n+1 si2i, then −s = 2n +
P∞
i=n+1(1 − si)2i. In particular, this implies that s is a
negative integer if and only if there exists an integer N such that sn = 1 for all n ≥ N.
Moreover, every odd integer q has an inverse in Z2 which can be computed by the formula
q−1 =
P∞
n=0 q0n, where q = 1 − q0.
The following theorem gives a complete characterization of eventually periodic 2-adic binary
sequences in terms of 2-adic integers (see [10] for the proof).
Theorem 1 Let S = (sn)n∈N be a binary sequence and s =
P∞
n=0 sn2n be the associated 2-adic
integer. The sequence S is eventually periodic if and only if there exist two numbers p and q in
Z, q odd, such that s = p/q. Moreover, S is strictly periodic if and only if pq ≤ 0 and |p| ≤ |q|.
An important fact is that the period of the rational number p/q is known since Gauss
(cf. [10]):
Theorem 2 Let S be an eventually periodic binary sequence, let s = p/q, with q odd and p and
q coprime, be the corresponding 2-adic number in its rational representation. The period of S is
the order of 2 modulo q, i.e., the smallest integer t such that 2t ≡ 1 (mod q).
1.2 Realization of eventually periodic binary sequences with FCSR circuits
In the sequel, we identify the sequence S = (sn)n∈N and the 2-adic integer s =
Pn
i=0 si2i.
The 2-adic division p/q can be easily performed by a Galois architecture using Feedback
with Carry Shift Register (FCSR circuits). For simpliﬁcation, we will only consider p ≥ 0 and
odd q = 1−q0 < 0. If pq > 0, it is easy to compute −p/q and then to obtain p/q by the formula
−s = 2n +
P∞
i=n+1(1 − si)2i.
Under the hypothesis q < 0 ≤ p, p < −q, p =
Pk−1
i=0 pi2i, q = 1 − 2d and d =
Pk−1
i=0 di2i, the
2-adic division p/q is performed by the following circuit:pk−1 -pk−2 - p1 - p0 - -
6
c p
6
c p
6
6
c p
6
6
c p
6
- dk−1 - dk−2 - d1 - d0
Where the symbol  denotes the addition with carry, i.e., it corresponds to the following
scheme:
 
H H
- a
- b
- cn−1
- s=a⊕b⊕cn−1
cn=ab⊕acn−1⊕bcn−1

Deﬁnition 1 The 2-adic complexity of a binary eventually periodic sequence is the length (i.e.,
the number of cells) of the smallest FCSR generating S.
Remark 1 Let S be a binary sequence. If S = p/q with p and q coprime integers, then the
2-adic (or FCSR) complexity Λ2 of S is the maximum of bitlengths of |p| and |q| (cf. [10]).
As for the LFSR generators, a binary sequence generated by a FCSR generator cannot be
used directly for cryptographic applications, since it is easy to recover this structure with a kind
of Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [8], or with the Euclidean algorithm applied to integers [4]:
Theorem 3 (Euclidean Algorithm Synthesis [4]) Let S be a an eventually periodic sequence with
2-adic complexity Λ2. Then it is possible to compute integers p,q such that the 2-adic expansion
of p/q is S, using only the ﬁrst 2Λ2 + 1 bits of S and in time O(Λ2
2).
1.3 Statistic quality of 2-adic binary sequences
We consider a binary periodic sequence S generated by a FCSR with negative prime divisor q
such that the order of 2 modulo q is exactly T = |q| − 1, i.e. the period of S is T. The main
heuristic is the fact that, except from the 2-adic point of view, this sequence can be considered
as random from the family of periodic sequences of period T. Note that when LFSR generators
are used in cryptographic tools, a similar hypothesis is implicitly assumed for LFSR sequences.
Experimentally, the sequences generated by a FCSR generator indeed succeeded the NIST
test suite (cf. [16]).
There exists another argument about the randomness of the FCSR sequences: in our practical
application (cf. Part III) we consider a negative prime number q such that 2128 < −q < 2129.
Moreover, the period of the generated sequence is |q| − 1. Consider any sequence (s0,...,s127)
of 128 bits. Let s =
P128
i=0 si2i be the corresponding integer. Set p = sq mod 2128. Then the
sequence (s0,...,s127) is the 128 ﬁrst bits of the 2-adic expansion of p/q. In other word, since,
except for p = 0, there is a single cycle, any sequence of 128 bits can be generated in a 2-adic
sequence generated by our FCSR generator with a non-zero initialization.
2 The FCSR automaton
This section is devoted to an extensive study of a FCSR circuit considered as an automaton.2.1 Description of the automaton
Let q = 1−2d be a negative prime. The FCSR generator with feedback prime q can be described
as a circuit containing two registers:
• The main register M with k binary memories (one for each cell), where k is the bitlength
of d, that is 2k−1 ≤ d < 2k.
• The carry register C with ` binary memories (one for each cell with a  at its left) where
` + 1 is the Hamming weight of d. Using the binary expansion
Pk−1
i=0 di2i of d, we put
Id = {i | 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and di = 1}. So ` = #Id. We also put d∗ = d − 2k−1.
We will say that the main register contains the integer m =
Pk−1
i=0 mi2i when it contains the
binary values (m0,...,mk−1). The content m of the main register always satisﬁes 0 ≤ m ≤ 2k−1.
In order to use similar notation for the carry register, we can think of it as a k bit register where
the k − l bits of rank not in Id are always 0. The content c =
P
i∈Id ci2i of the carry register
always satisﬁes 0 ≤ c ≤ d∗.
Example 1 Let q = −347, so d = 174 = 0xAE, k = 8 and ` = 4. The following diagram shows
these two registers:
m(t) m7 m6 m5 m4 m3 m2 m1 m0 - - - - - - - - -    
6 6 6 6
c(t) 0 0 c5 0 c3 c2 c1 0
? ? ? ?
6 6 6 6
d 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
2.2 Transition function
As described above, the FCSR circuit with feedback prime q is an automaton with 2k+l states
corresponding to the k +l binary memories of main and carry registers. We say that the FCSR
circuit is in state (m,c) if the main and carry registers contain respectively the binary expansion
of m and of c.
Suppose that at time t, the FCSR circuit is in state (m(t),c(t)) with m =
Pk−1
i=0 mi(t)2i and
c =
Pk−1
i=0 ci(t)2i. The state (m(t + 1),c(t + 1)) at time t + 1 is computed using:
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and i / ∈ Id
mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t)
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and i ∈ Id
mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t) ⊕ ci(t) ⊕ m0(t)
ci(t + 1) := mi+1(t)ci(t) ⊕ ci(t)m0(t)
⊕ m0(t)mi+1(t)
• For the case i = k − 1
mk−1(t + 1) := m0(t).
Note that this transition function is described with (at most) quadratic boolean functions
and that for all three cases mi(t + 1) can be expressed with a single formula:
mi(t + 1) := mi+1(t) ⊕ dici(t) ⊕ dim0(t)if we put mk(t) = 0 and ck−1(t) = 0.
The transition function can also be described with the following global presentation (express-
ing integers m(t),c(t) instead of bits mi(t),ci(t)) more suitable for software implementations
(here ⊕ denotes bitwise addition without carries, and ⊗ denotes bitwise and):
m(t + 1) := bm(t)/2c ⊕ c(t) ⊕ m0(t)d
c(t + 1) := bm(t)/2c ⊗ c(t) ⊕ c(t) ⊗ m0(t)d
⊕ m0(t)d ⊗ bm(t)/2c
Remark 2 The case d = 2k−1 (that is Id = ∅) gives a circuit with no feedback and generating
a periodic sequence of period length k. If we exclude this uninteresting case, we have
2k < |q| < 2k+1.
2.3 Some properties of the automaton
If m =
Pk−1
i=0 mi2i is the content of the main register, we denote by m =
Pk−1
i=0 (1 − mi)2i the
binary complement of m. So, we have m = 2k − 1 − m. If c =
P
i∈Id ci2i is the content of the
carry register, we denote by c =
P
i∈Id(1 − ci)2i obtained by complementing the “useful” bits
of c. We have c = d − 2k−1 − c.
In the sequel, we suppose that the initial value of the carry register is not necessary 0. Here
are some results on the evolution of the automaton.
Proposition 1 Assume that the FCSR is initially in state (m,c) and let p = m + 2c. Then
0 ≤ p ≤ |q| and the sequence generated by the FCSR is the 2-adic expansion of p/q.
Reciprocally, if 0 ≤ p ≤ |q| then there exists at least one state (m,c) of the FCSR automaton
such that p = m + 2c.
Lemma 1 Assume that the FCSR is in state (m,c) at time t and is in state (m0,c0) at time t+1
after one transition. Put p = m + 2c and p0 = m0 + 2c0. Then we have 2p0 ≡ p modulo q. More
precisely, if p ≡ 0 modulo 2 (i.e. the feedback m0 is 0), then p0 = p/2, else, p0 = (p − q)/2
(remember that q is negative).
Now, we are interested in an automaton which produces a sequence of maximum length, i.e.
the order of 2 modulo q is |q| − 1 and the period is exactly |q| − 1.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the transition function of the FCSR automaton applied to a state (m,c)
gives a state (m0,c0). Then the transition function applied to the state (m,c) gives the state
(m0,c0).
Proposition 2 Assume that the order of 2 modulo q is |q| − 1. The period of the generated
sequence consists of two half-periods where the second half is the binary conjugate of the ﬁrst.
Note that there are 2k+` distinct states. Diﬀerent initial states can produce identical se-
quences. If (m,c) and (m0,c0) are such states, then clearly p = m + 2c = m0 + 2c0.
However, under the hypothesis ”the order of 2 modulo q is |q|−1”, the graph of the transition
function on the states contains only one cycle of length |q| − 1.2.4 Sequences produced by the main register
We now study the sequences of values taken by the binary memories of the main register, that
is the sequences Mi = (mi(t))t∈N, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
Theorem 4 Consider the FCSR automaton with (negative) feedback prime q = 1 − 2d. Let k
be the bitlength of d. Then, for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k −1, there exists an integer pi such that
Mi is the 2-adic expansion of pi/q. More precisely, these values pi can be easily computed from
the initial states mi(0) and ci(0) using the recursive following formulas:
pi =

qmi(0) + 2pi+1 if di = 0
q(mi(0) + 2ci(0)) + 2(pi+1 + p0) if di = 1.
3 Filtered FCSR automaton
3.1 How to ﬁlter a FCSR automaton?
As for LFSR automatas, a FCSR automaton cannot be used directly for a cryptographic use:
the sequences produced have good statistical properties and high linear complexity, but the
2-adic structure can be recovered easily as shown by [8] and also by Theorem 3.
For the LFSR case many tools have been developed to mask the structure of the generator, by
using boolean functions with suitable properties (see for example [5]) to combine several LFSR,
by using combiners with memory [15] or by shrinking the sequence produced by a LFSR [6].
It is possible to use similar methods with a FCSR generator, but with a very important
diﬀerence: since a FCSR generator looks like a random generator from the point of view of
linearity, it is not necessary to use a ﬁlter function with high non-linearity!
Then the best functions for ﬁltering a FCSR generators are linear functions:
f : GF(2)n 7→ GF(2),
f(x1,...,xn) =
Ln
i=1 fixi, fi ∈ GF(2).
As studied previously, the sequence Mi observed on the i-th dividend register is a 2-adic
fraction, with known period, good statistical properties and looks like a random sequence except
from the point of view of 2-adic complexity.
The sequence Ci, i ∈ I∗
d is not so good from a statistical point of view: these sequence are
probably balanced, however, if a carry register is in the state 1 (resp. 0), it remains in the same
state 1 (resp. 0) with a probability 3/4 since each of the 2 other entries of the corresponding
addition box corresponds to 2-adic fractions and produces a 1 with a probability approximatively
1/2. It is suﬃcient to have only one more 1 to produces a 1 in the carry register.
These remarks lead to ﬁlter only on the k cells mi(t) of the main register, not on the cells of
the carry register.
To modelize our linear combiner (the ﬁlter), we consider a binary vector F = (f0,...,fk−1)
of length k.
The output sequence of our ﬁltered FCSR is then
S = (s(t))t∈N, where s(t) =
n M
i=1
fi · mi(t).3.2 Design of a ﬁltered FCSR pseudo-random generator
In this part, we will describe the design of a ﬁltered generator with a static ﬁlter (SF-FCSR
generator).
3.2.1 Choice of the FCSR automaton
For a cryptographic use with a security greater than 2100, we recommend the use of a negative
retroaction prime −q, corresponding to k = 128. This implies that 2128 < |q| < 2129 − 1.
In order to maximize the period of the generated sequence, the order of 2 modulo q must be
maximal i.e. equals to |q| − 1. Moreover, to avoid some potential particular cases, we propose
to choose a prime q such that (|q| − 1)/2 is also a prime.
The FCSR retroaction prime must be public. We propose
−q = 493877400643443608888382048200783943827. (1)
The binary expansion of d = (|q| + 1)/2 is
1011100111000110101010011110101010110111111000100101111111010110
1001111010000110001101101001101000011000010101101110110001001010.
Its Hamming weight is 69 and then there are ` = 68 carry cells ( the Hamming weight of
d∗ = d − 2128) and k = 128 cells in the main register.
3.2.2 Choice of the ﬁlter
Let kF be the integer such that 2kF ≤ F < 2kF+1. We will see in Paragraph 3.3 that it is
possible to develop an attack on the initial key which needs 4kF tries.
If F is a power of 2, the output is a 2-adic sequence and is not resistant to 2-adic attacks.
Moreover, if F is known, and its binary expansion contains few 1, the ﬁrst equations of the
algebraic attack are simpler, even if it is not possible to develop such attack (cf. Paragraph 3.6).
A ﬁrst natural solution would be to choose F = 2128 − 1, that is to xor all the cells of the
main register. In this case, suppose that the output is S = (s(t))t∈N. It is easy to check that
the sequence S0 = (s(t) + s(t + 1))t∈N is the same that those that would be obtained by xoring
all the carry cells. Even if we do not know how to use this fact to develop a cryptanalysis, we
prefer to use another ﬁlter for this reason.
In our application, we propose to choose F = d = (|q| + 1)/2. With this ﬁlter, the output
is the XOR of all cells of the main register which are just at the right of a carry cell. For the
prime q proposed above in (1) the value of kF is 128 and the Hamming weight of the ﬁlter is 69.
We propose a very simple initialization of the SF-FCSR generator: we choose a key K with
128 bits.We use the key K directly to initialize the main register M. The carry register is
initialized to 0.
3.3 2-adic cryptanalysis of a SF-FCSR generator
XOR of two or more 2-adic integers
Let q be a negative prime such that 2 is of order |q|−1 modulo q. Consider the xor (p1/q)⊕(p2/q)
of the 2-adic expansion of two fractions with q as denominator and 0 < p1,p2 < |q|. By
Theorem 2, both summands are a sequence of period |q| − 1 so the xor is also a sequence ofperiod |q| − 1 (or dividing it). Can this latter sequence written also as a fraction p/q? (with
0 ≤ p ≤ q and possibly non reduced). Surely, the answer is yes in some cases (e.g. if p1 = p2).
But in very most cases, the answer is no. Here is an heuristic argument to show this under the
assumption that such an xor gives a random sequence of period dividing |q| − 1. The number
of such sequences is 2|q|−1 and the number of sequences of the form (p1/q) ⊕ (p2/q) is at most
(|q| − 1)2/2. So we can expect that the probability that the xor can be written p/q is about
|q|2/2|q| which is very small. This remark extends to the xor of O(ln|q|) summands.
A 2-adic attack
Theorem 5 Assume that the ﬁlter F is known by the attacker and let kF be an integer such that
F < 2kF+1 (that is all cells selected by the ﬁlter belong to the rightmost kF +1 cells of the main
register). Then the attacker can discover the key of the generator at a cost O(exp(kF)kFk2).
We ﬁrst state a Lemma.
Lemma 3 Assume that the attacker knows the initial values mi(0) and ci(0) for 0 ≤ i < kF.
Then he can compute the T ﬁrst bits mkF(t) (for 0 ≤ t < T) of the sequence MkF by observing
the sequence outputted by the generator, in time O(TkF).
Proof : The attacker observes ﬁrst S(0) =
LkF
i=0 fimi(0). In this equality, the only unknown
value is mkF(0) so the attacker can compute it in time O(kF). For subsequent bits the method
generalizes as follows.
Assume that the attacker has computed bits mkF(t) for 0 ≤ t < τ. Observing the bit S(τ)
he gets
S(τ) =
kF M
i=0
Fimi(τ)
and the only unknown value here is mkF(τ). So the attacker obtains it, also in time O(kF). We
obtain the result by induction. 
The attack whose existence is asserted in the Theorem works following ﬁve steps.
• Choose an arbitrary new set of values for the bits mi(0) and ci(0) for 0 ≤ i < kF.
• Assuming that these bits really contain the values chosen, compute the 2k +1 ﬁrst bits of
the sequence MkF.
• Use the Euclidean Synthesis Algorithm from Theorem 3 to compute a 2-adic fraction whose
the expansion is the sequence MkF.
• Use the formulas of Theorem 4 to compute the corresponding 2-adic fraction for M0. If
the denominator is not q then return to step 1.
• The numerator obtained is then a good candidate for the key. After all possibilities in
step 1 are exhausted, use some more bits of the generator to determine which key is the
true key, among the good candidates found.
Now the proof of the Theorem:Proof : From Lemma 3, the cost of Step 2 is in O(kkF) ≤ O(k2). Then Step 3 has also a
cost of O(k2). Each use of a formula of Theorem 4 has a cost in O(k2) so the cost of Step 4 is
in O(k2kF). The loop deﬁned by Step 1 has to be iterated O(expkF) times. Multiplying the
number of iterations by the inner cost gives the cost of the whole attack. 
Note that, with our parameters k = 128 and kF = 127, this attack is more expansive than
the exhaustive attack on the key.
3.4 Statistical properties of the ﬁltered output
Then two or more sequences are xored, the resulting sequence has good statistical properties as
soon as one of the sequences is good, under the restriction that this sequence is not correlated
with the other.
In our generator, each sequence is a 2-adic fraction with denominator q and has good statis-
tical properties. The only problem is the fact that these sequences are not independent, since
they are obtained by distinct shifts of the same periodic sequence. Note that the period of the
sequence is very large (T ≥ 2127), and that a priori the 69 distinct shifts looks like random shifts.
So the output sequence will have good statistical properties.
This hypothesis is comforted by the fact that our generator passes the NIST statistical test
suite, as we checked.
3.5 Linear cryptanalysis of a SF-FCSR generator
XOR of two or more 2-adic integers
Let q be a negative prime such that 2 is of order |q|−1 modulo q. Consider the xor (p1/q)⊕(p2/q)
of the 2-adic expansion of two fractions with q as denominator, and numerators such that
0 < p1,p2 < |q|. Similar arguments as those above about the 2-adic behavior of this xor applies
to its linear behavior.
If this xor corresponds to the expansion of a series P(X)/Q(X) (written as a fraction in
reduced form), then the order of the polynomial Q must be a divisor of T = |q| − 1. With the
value of q proposed in 1, the order of Q must be 1, 2, T, or T/2. The only polynomials of
order 1 or 2 are the powers of (X +1). Polynomials of order T or T/2 must have an irreducible
factor Q1 of order T or T/2. But this order must be a divisor of 2deg(Q1) − 1, so deg(Q1) is a
multiple of the order of 2 modulo q. In the case of the above value of q, this order is T/2, a
number of bitsize 127. Hence polynomials Q with a divisor of such a degree are not so frequent.
3.6 Algebraic cryptanalysis of a SF-FCSR generator
The algebraic cryptanalysis of a pseudorandom generator is a tool developed recently cf.[1].
The principle is simple: we consider the bits of the initial state
m = (m0,...,mk−1) = (m0(0)...,mk−1(0)) as the set of unknowns (suppose ﬁrst that the initial
value of the carry register is 0) and, using the transition function, we compute the successive
outputs of the generator as functions of these unknowns fi(m0,...,mk−1). If we guess the ﬁrst
bits the outputed by the generator, we get system of (non-linear) equations in k variables. We
can add to this system the equations m2
i = mi as the unknowns are Booleans. If the system
obtained is not too complicated, it can be solved using for example the Gr¨ obner basis methods
cf.[2].For example, let us consider the FCSR automaton associated to the divisor q = −13. In this
case, k = 3. The transition function is then:
Trans((m0,m1,m2),(c0,c1)) =
((m1 ⊕ m0 ⊕ c0,m2 ⊕ m0 ⊕ c1,m0),(c0m0 ⊕ c0m1 ⊕ m0m1,c2m0 ⊕ c2m2 ⊕ m0m2)).
If the output of the generator is the content m0(t) of the ﬁrst cell of the main register, and
the initial state is m = (m0,m1,m2) and c = (0,0), we get the system:
m0 = m0(0),
m0 ⊕ m1 = m0(1),
m0m1 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m2 = m0(2),
m0m1m2 ⊕ m0m1 ⊕ m1m2 ⊕ m0 ⊕ m2 = m0(3),
m0m1 ⊕ m0m2 ⊕ m1m2 ⊕ m0 ⊕ m1 = m0(4),
...
Note that in this example, k = 3 and then the maximum degree of the equations is 3. For
general k, the equations obtained (except for the very ﬁrst ones of the ones we should get if we
could iterate the transition function over an entire period) are of large degree. (In fact half of
them are of degree k and most of the others of degree k − 1.) For a cryptographic use, k ' 128
and the period is about 2128....
Note that the fact we use a known ﬁlter does not increase the diﬃculty of this attack. The
ﬁlter is just a ﬁrewall against a 2-adic cryptanalysis.
4 Design of a dynamic ﬁltered FCSR generator
Due to the fact that the ﬁlter is very simple and its quality is easy to check, it is possible to
use a dynamic ﬁlter: the ﬁlter can be constructed as a function of the key K, and then, is not
known by the attacker. As soon as the ﬁlter is not trivial (F 6= 0 and F 6= 2i), it is not possible
to use the algebraic attack, nor the attack using a small binary size of F.
The construction of this dynamic ﬁltered FCSR generator (DF-FCSR generator) is very
simple: Let g be a bijective map of GF(2)128 onto itself. For a 128 bits key K, we construct
the ﬁlter F = g(K) and also we use the key to initialize the main register. The carry register is
initialized to 0, since the attacker cannot even ﬁnd the equations for the algebraic attack.
It is suitable to add a quality test for the ﬁlter, for example by testing the binary size r of
F and its Hamming weight w(F). For example, if r < 100 or w(F) < 40, then we iterate g to
obtain another ﬁlter with good quality.
As an example, we propose to use for g the Rijndael S-box (cf. [17, 18]. This S-box operates
on 8 bits bytes, and using it for each 16 bytes of a 128 bits key, we get a suitable function g.
The use of this dynamic ﬁlter is very simple. The main advantage is to thwart completely
the 2-adic attack (Par. 3.3 and the algebraic attack (Par. 3.6).
Conclusion
We proposed a very fast random generator, easy to implement especially in hardware (but also
in software). It has good statistical properties and it is resistant to all known attacks. Its
design can be compared to older generators (such as the summation generator [19]) for whose
the hearth has a linear structure, and is broken by a 2-adic device. Our generator has a hearth
with a 2-adic structure which is broken by a linear ﬁlter. Our generator might be of similarinterest of these older generators (the summation generator is one of the best generator known)
while being even easy to implement by the simplicity of the ﬁlter.
The C programs implementing our generators are available on the web site
http://www.unilim.fr/pages-perso/francois.arnault/index.html/#sasc
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B. Primitive speciﬁcation and supporting documentation
B.1 Our Filtered FCSR stream ciphers are based on a very simple mechanism: the output is obtained by ﬁltering
internal states of an FCSR automaton using linear Boolean functions. A full description of the method is
given in Section 1. Some more extensive documentation could be ﬁnd in enclosed references [1, 2, 3].
Our proposal contains two variants of such F-FCSR stream ciphers:
F-FCSR-8: this version satisﬁes the requirements of Proﬁle 1 (key length: 128 bits, IV length: up to
128 bits). However its most eﬃcient use would be in a mixed software/hardware implementation. More
precisely, a part of the setup phase (the selection of the ﬁlter) would gain to be software implemented,
while the remaining of the primitive (in particular the keystream generation) would gain to be hardware
implemented. In this case the eﬃciency of F-FCSR-8 would be even greater than the purely hardware
version we propose below in this same document, because an FCSR of shorter length (128) is used.
In a pure software implementation, the performances of F-FCSR-8 are given in Section 5.
F-FCSR-H: this version satisﬁes the requirements of Proﬁle 2: key length: 80 bits, IV length: up to 80
bits.
In this version, the ﬁlter is ﬁxed and never changed. For that reason, we have chosen an FCSR automaton
of length 160 in order the cost of Time/Memory/Data tradeoﬀ attacks be as expensive as an exhaustive
keysearch.
A complete hardware and software description of the primitives F-FCSR-8 and F-FCSR-H are given in
Section 1.
B.2 We attest that there is no hidden weakness in the proposed Stream Ciphers F-FCSR-8 and F-FCSR-H.
In particular, the primes q has been chosen randomly and certiﬁed using MAGMA between the set of
integers of size 129 or 161 satisfying Conditions 1. If necessary, they can be changed by any prime with
respect to Conditions 1.
B.3 The security level of the two proposals is expected to be equal to an exhaustive keysearch.
More details about security analysis on Filtered FCSR generators are given in Section 2 and in the enclosed
papers [1, 2, 3].
B.4 The main advantage of the use of ﬁltered FCSRs is the combination of two fact:
1) Sequences generated by FCSR automata are well-known, with proved properties, which helps to evaluate
security.
2) FCSR automata with linear ﬁlters are very fast, especially in hardware. (but also in software).
For details see Section 3.
B.5 Due to the simplicity of these stream ciphers, the design rationale is limited to
- the choice of the FCSR automaton, that is the choice of the size of the register and of the connection
integer q.
- the choice of the ﬁlter for F-FCSR-H
- the construction of the ﬁlter for F-FCSR-8
- the design of the key setup and change of IV procedures.
For details, see Section 4B.6 F-FCSR designs are very suitable for hardware applications since they are very easy to describe and very
eﬃcient (cf Section 1.1.2). The number of gates used is small enough to allow integration of F-FCSR-H
or F-FCSR-8 designs in embedded system.
Hardware and software performances are given in Section 5.
B.7 Due to the simplicity of hardware and software implementations of ﬁltered FCSR, the techniques for
implementers are described by algorithms and circuits of Section 1.
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The proposed stream ciphers are additive ones : the key K and the IV are used to produce a pseudorandom
stream of binary digits of same length as the plaintext. Encryption is done by combining the pseudorandom
stream with the plaintext stream using the XOR function. Decryption is done by combining the pseudorandom
stream with the ciphertext stream.
In the two proposals, the pseudorandom stream is obtained using a ﬁltered FCSR automaton. A FCSR
automaton has two registers: a main register M which stores n bits values, and a carries register C which stores
` bits values. For Proposal F-FCSR-8, n = 128 and ` = 65. For Proposal F-FCSR-H, n = 160 and l = 82.
For each of the proposals, we will give a complete description and details about the following procedures:
a. Key setup This procedure takes as input a key K of size k and outputs a value Minit of bitsize n used to
initialize the main register (this Minit will be recalled before each change if IV if any). The procedure
outputs also a ﬁlter F of bitsize n that will be constant while the key will be unchanged. It is called only
once for each new key. For F-FCSR-8, we will have k = n = 128.
b. IV setup (or change of IV) This procedure will be used just after Key setup, and also when change of IV
occurs. It takes the value Minit computed by Key setup and the IV as inputs. It sets the FCSR automaton
(both registers M and C) in a state just ready for beginning extraction of pseudorandom stream.
These two procedures will be merged in only one [Key+IV setup] for F-FCSR-H. The resulting procedure
will be used at each change of Key and/or IV. In this version, k = 80 and 0 ≤ v ≤ 80 (for example v = 64
or 32).
c. Extraction of the pseudorandom stream This procedure is iterated (after [a] and [b] have been run)
while pseudorandom data is needed. It can be described as two steps. First, the automaton is clocked
(the transition function is applied). Then a pseudorandom byte is extracted by ﬁltering the contents of
the cells of the automaton.
Before the description of each version, we will give a description of a FCSR automaton and the conditions
required for the parameter q of this automaton.
1.1 FCSR automaton
Detailed descriptions can be found in [1, 2, 3].
A Feedback with Carry Shift Register (FCSR) is an automaton which computes the binary expansion of a
2-adic number p/q, where p and q are some integers, with q is odd. We will assume that q < 0 < p < |q|. The
size n of the FCSR is such that n + 1 is the bitlength of |q|.
In our applications, p depends on the secret key (and the IV), and q is a public parameter. The choice of q
induces many properties of the keystream. The most important one is that it completely determines the length
of the period of the keystream. The conditions for an optimal choice are:
Conditions 1
• q is a (negative) prime of bitsize n + 1.
• The order of 2 modulo q is |q| − 1.
• T = (|q| − 1)/2 is also prime.
• Set d = (1 + |q|)/2. The Hamming weight W(d) of the binary expansion of d is not too small. Typically,
W(d) > n/2.
1.1.1 Software description of the transition function
The FCSR automaton contains two registers (sets of cells): the main register M and the carries register C.
The main register M contains n cells. We denote mi (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) the binary digits contained in these
cells and we call the integer m =
Pn−1
i=0 mi2i the content (or state) of M.
Let d be the positive integer d = (1 − q)/2 and d =
Pn−1
i=0 di2i its binary expansion. The carries register
contains l cells where l + 1 is the number of nonzero di digits. More precisely, the carries register contains one
cell for each nonzero di with 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2. We denote ci the binary digit contained in this cell. We also putci = 0 when di = 0 or when i = n − 1. We call the integer c =
Pn−2
i=0 ci2i the content (or state) of C. The
Hamming weight of the binary expansion of c is at most l.
The transition function can be described by
m(t + 1) := (m(t)div2) ⊕ c(t) ⊕ m0(t)d
c(t + 1) := (m(t)div2) ⊗ c(t) ⊕ c(t) ⊗ m0(t)d ⊕ m0(t)d ⊗ (m(t)div2)
where ⊕ denotes bitwise XOR, ⊗ denotes bitwise AND, and div2 is a just a shift to the right.
Note that m0(t) is the least signiﬁcant bit of m(t). The integers m(t), c(t) and d are integers of bitsize n
(or less).
1.1.2 Hardware description of the transition function
With the same notations, the hardware description of the FCSR generator is
pn−1 - pn−2 - p1 - p0 - -
6
d p
6
d p
6
6
d p
6
6
d p
6
- dn−1 - dn−2 - d1 - d0
where the symbol  denotes the addition with carry, i.e., it corresponds to the following scheme:
 
H H
- a
- b
- ci−1
- s=a⊕b⊕ci−1
ci=ab⊕aci−1⊕bci−1

As an example, if q = −347, so d = 174 = 0xAE, n = 8 and l = 4, we obtain the following diagram:
m(t) m7 m6 m5 m4 m3 m2 m1 m0 - - - - - - -
registres
- -
6 6 6 6
c(t) 0 0 c5 0 c3 c2 c1 0
? ? ? ?
6 6 6 6
d 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1.2 Filtering
We extract each pseudorandom bit from the state of the main register of the FCSR automaton using a ﬁlter.
This ﬁlter describes which cells are selected to produce the pseudorandom bit. In order to obtain a byte in
output, eight one bit subﬁlters are used to extract the output byte after each transition of the automaton.
1.2.1 Principle of one bit ﬁltering
The ﬁlter F is a bitstring (f0,...,fn−1) of length n (or equivalently the integer
Pn−1
i=0 fi2i). The output bit is
obtained by computing the weight parity of the bitwise AND of the state M of the main register and of the
ﬁlter F:
Output bit :=
n−1 M
i=0
fimi.
Or, equivalently:
S = M ⊗ F
Output bit := parity(S)1.2.2 Byte ﬁltering
This method is very similar to bit ﬁltering.
The ﬁlter F is also a bitstring (f0,...,fn−1) of length n (which is a multiple of 8). It splits into 8 subﬁlters
F0,...,F7 each deﬁned by
Fj =
n/8−1 X
i=0
f8i+j2i.
Each subﬁlter Fj selects some cells mi in the main register among the ones satisfying i ≡ j modulo 8. The
parity of the binary word obtained gives one pseudorandom bit :
bit j of output byte :=
n/8−1 M
i=0
f8i+jm8i+j.
As there are 8 subﬁlters, we get 8 bits at each transition of the automaton.
This procedure can be described equivalently as follows. The ﬁlter F and the state of M are combined with
the AND function. The result is split in n/8 bytes. The pseudorandom byte is obtained by XORing these n/8
bytes:
S := M ⊗ F
Deﬁne Si by S =
Pn/8−1
i=0 Si · 256i, with 0 ≤ Si ≤ n/8 − 1
Output byte :=
Ln/8−1
i=0 Si.
Note that it is faster to extract a byte than a single bit.
1.3 F-FCSR-8: Proﬁle 1, output 1 byte per round
This proposal uses keys of length k = 128 and an IV of length v = 128 or 64 (any length v ≤ 128 can be used).
An IV of value 0 can be used as a default if no value is provided by the application.
According to Conditions 1 we choose for q the following number
−q = 493877400643443608888382048200783943827
as the public parameter of the automaton. The corresponding bitstring d = (|q| + 1)/2 which describes the
positions of the carries cells is
d = (B9C6A9EA B7E25FD6 9E86369A 1856EC4A)16.
Its Hamming weight is 69 and there are ` = 68 cells (the Hamming weight of d∗ = d − 2127) in the carries
register and n = 128 cells in the main register.
The ﬁlter depends on the key. To avoid potentially weak cases, we need a quality test on the ﬁlter. This
test is provided by the following function which takes as input a bitstring of length 128 and outputs True if it
is suitable as a ﬁlter for our application. Else it outputs False.
Function GoodFilter (F)
Deﬁne the 8 subﬁlters F0,...,F7, each of bitlength 16, by
Fj = (fj,f8+j,f16+j,...,f8j+j,...,f120+j).
IF any one of the subﬁlters Fj has an Hamming weight < 3 THEN output False;
Output True (in all other cases).
End Function
a. Initial Setup (Input a key K of 128 bits)
M := K (put the key in the main register)
While NOT GoodFilter(M) Repeat
C := 0Clock the FCSR automaton 6 times.
End while.
F := M (The content of main register will be the ﬁlter)
C := 0 (Clear the carries)
Clock the FCSR automaton 128 times (Wait for diﬀusion of the key)
Minit := M (Save the content of the main register)
b. Change of IV (Input: an IV of bitsize v ≤ 128)
M := Minit
C := 0 (Clear the carries)
If v ≤ 64 Then IV1 := (064−vkIV) (complete IV with zeroes)
Else (65 ≤ v ≤ 128) Do (IV2kIV1) := (0128−vkIV) (complete IV with zeroes and split it in two 64
bits strings)
C := (04kIV1) (Put IV1 in the 64 least signiﬁcant bits of C)
Apply 64 times the transition function to the FCSR automaton.
If 65 ≤ v Then
C := (04kIV2) (Put IV2 in the 64 least signiﬁcant bits of C)
Apply 64 times the transition function to the FCSR automaton.
End If
M := Minit (Recall the content of M saved after phase [a])
c. Extraction of the pseudorandom stream We use the one byte ﬁltering method described above, while
pseudorandom data is needed. At each clock of the FCSR automaton, the content of the main register M
is ANDed with the ﬁlter F:
S = M ⊗ F
S is split in 16 bytes S =
P15
i=0 Si16i
The pseudorandom byte is the XOR of these bytes: Output byte :=
L15
i=0 Si
The Initial Setup step is easier to implement in software (at least the ﬁlter quality check). Steps b and c
would be extremely fast if implemented in hardware.
1.4 F-FCSR-H: Proﬁle 2, output 1 byte per round
This second proposal uses keys of length 80 and IV of bitsize v with 32 ≤ v ≤ 80. An IV of value 0 can be used
as a default if no value is provided.
The FCSR length (size of the main register) is n = 160. The carries register contains ` = 82 cells. The
retroaction prime is
q = −1993524591318275015328041611344215036460140087963
so addition boxes and carries cells are present at the positions matching the ones (except of the leading one) in
the following 160 bits string (which has Hamming weight 83)
d = (1 + |q|)/2 = (AE985DFF 26619FC5 8623DC8A AF46D590 3DD4254E)16.
Filtering
To extract one pseudorandom byte, we use the static ﬁlter
F = d = (AE985DFF 26619FC5 8623DC8A AF46D590 3DD4254E)16
The ﬁlter F splits in 8 subﬁlters (subﬁlter j is obtained by selecting the bit j in each byte of F)
F0 = (0011 0111 0100 1010 1010)2, F4 = (0111 0010 0010 0011 1100)2,
F1 = (1001 1010 1101 1100 0001)2, F5 = (1001 1100 0100 1000 1010)2,
F2 = (1011 1011 1010 1110 1111)2, F6 = (0011 0101 0010 0110 0101)2,
F3 = (1111 0010 0011 1000 1001)2, F7 = (1101 0011 1011 1011 0100)2.Recall that the bit bi (with 0 ≤ i ≤ 7) of each extracted byte is expressed by
bi =
19 M
j=0
f
(j)
i m8j+i where Fi =
P19
j=0 f
(j)
i 2j
and where the mk are the bits contained in the main register.
a+b. Key+IV setup (Inputs a key K of length k = 80 and an IV of length v ≤ 80)
1. The main register M is initialized with the key and the IV:
M := K + 280 · IV = (080−vkIVkK)
2. The carries register is initialized to 0 :
C := 0 = (082)
3. The FCSR is clocked 160 times. (Output is discarded in this step)
c. Extraction of pseudorandom data After setup phase, the pseudorandom stream is produced by repeat-
ing the following process as many times as needed
• Clock the FCSR
• Extract one pseudorandom byte using ﬁlter F as described above.2 Security properties
The expected security level of the two proposals are those of the exhaustive keysearch.
More details about security analysis on Filtered FCSR generators are given in the enclosed papers [1, 2, 3].
Resistance to generic attacks
• Statistical properties. There is not any known statistical bias on the pseudorandom sequences output by
our ﬁltered FCSR. We have check that they pass the Statistical Test Suite of the NIST.
• Linear complexity. Since 2-adic structure and quadratic automaton are not related with linear structure,
we can expect that the linear complexity of our pseudorandom sequences satisﬁes the same distribution
law as for a random sequence of period |q|−1 > 2128. Experiments we have done support this assumption.
• 2-adic complexity. The 2-adic structure is broken by the linear properties of the ﬁlter function. Hence, we
can expect that the 2-adic complexity of our pseudorandom sequences is high, as it is the case for random
sequences of period |q| − 1 > 2128.
• Algebraic cryptanalysis. The transition function of a FCSR automaton is quadratic and the ﬁlter function
F` is linear.
The algebraic equations are of the form F`(Ti
q(x)) = si.
At each iteration the degree of equations is increasing. It becomes computationally infeasible to obtain
such equations for i ≥ 12. To solve this system, we need at least 128 iterations.
• Correlation attack. There are two major obstacles to the adaptation of this attack on a ﬁltered FCSR.
The ﬁrst one is the fact that the function used to ﬁlter the automaton is linear with l inputs. Such a
function is l − 1 resilient, that is balanced and without correlation between its output and any sum of at
most l − 1 of its inputs. In that situation, the attack is more diﬃcult than the exhaustive one.
The second one is the fact that the dependencies between the cells of an FCSR automaton are nonlinear,
since the transition function is quadratic. It seems diﬃcult to obtain linear dependencies.
• Time-Memory-Data tradeoﬀ attacks. The size of the registers has been chosen in order the stream cipher
to be resistant to these attacks.
– If the ﬁlter F is known (as in F-FCSR-H), the number of states belonging to the main cycle of the
automaton is 2T, with 2n < 2T < 2n+1, where n + 1 is the size of q. We have chosen a size n for
the FCSR which is twice the size of the key in order to thwart time-memory-data trade-oﬀ attacks.
Precisely, we have chosen n = 160 for F-FCSR-H as the key size is k = 80.
– Suppose now that the ﬁlter is unknown from attacker. This is the situation for F-FCSR-8. The
number of states belonging to the main cycle of the automaton is greater than 2n for a ﬁxed ﬁlter
F. But there exists approximatively 2n possible ﬁlters. This gives a total number of states of 22n.
With n = k, the stream cipher remains resistant to time-memory-data trade-oﬀ attacks. This is why
we have chosen n = k = 128.
• Distinguishing attacks. Distinguishing attacks can be based on the existence of linear relations between
some internal states of the automaton which occur with a biased probability. Due to the existence of
carries, we did not ﬁnd such relations and we think that there are none.
Moreover, when the ﬁlter is unknown, it is not clear that such relations would be useful for an attack.
Probably more investigation would be interesting in order to conﬁrm that distinguishing attacks on our
stream ciphers are not easy, or else to ﬁnd one.
Dedicated attacks
Some dedicated attacks are designed in [1, 2, 3]:• 2-adic attack. This attack applies when the ﬁlter is known and when it (or its subﬁlters) is small (that
is selects only cells which are near the lower weight end of the FCSR). Precisely, if kF is the binary size
of F, i.e. the least integer such that F < 2kF, the initial value of the main register can be recovered in
O(2kFkFk2) operations. This attack does not apply for F-FCSR-8 as the ﬁlter is unknown. For F-FCSR-
H, the ﬁlter we have chosen has a high value for kF and this attack would be much more expensive than
an exhaustive one.
• Cryptanalysis with multiple ﬁlters. If more than one ﬁlter are used starting from the same initial state
of the automaton, it is possible to compute the ﬁltered output that would be obtained with any ﬁlter in
the subspace generated by the set of used ﬁlters. This is one of the justiﬁcations for the use of ﬁlters with
distinct supports.
Another remark about the design of our stream ciphers is the fact that it is not possible, by changing the
IV, to change the ﬁlter without also changing the initial state of the main register. So an attacker cannot
mount a multiple ﬁlters attack.
Weak keys
F-FCSR-8 Using the null key with a null IV makes the stream generation fail (no ﬁlter passing the quality
test will be found). Since a quality test is used to select the ﬁlter, there are no other weak keys in view
of the current cryptanalytic knowledge.
F-FCSR-H Using the null key (080) with a null IV makes the ciphertext identical to the plaintext. As the
period of the FCSR automaton is |q| − 1, there are no other weak keys.3 Strengths and advantages of the primitive
The main advantages in the use of ﬁltered FCSRs is the fact that there are some proved results on the output
sequence, and the proposed algorithms are eﬃcient both in software and hardware implementations.
3.1 Advantages in the use of a FCSR automaton
• The period of the sequence is well known and proved.
• Except of the state 0, there is no other degenerated state.
• The outputsequence is non linear. It becomes possible to use a linear ﬁlter.
• A FCSR automaton is quadratic: it is intrinsically resistant to algebraic attacks.
• The hardware and software implementations of an FCSR automaton are simple, eﬃcient and of low cost.
They use similar techniques as for LFSR registers.
3.2 Advantages in the use of a linear ﬁlter
• Linear Boolean functions are the best ones from the point of view of correlation and non-resilience.
• Linear Boolean function are simple to implement both in hardware and software. In particular, it is
possible to use Boolean functions with a large number of inputs (typically at least 64). They are cheap,
both in time and in circuit size.
Both versions use 8 subﬁlters to output a whole byte at each round.
3.3 F-FCSR-8
The use of a ﬁlter which is key-dependent permits to expect a high level of security with a relatively small
FCSR length.
In counterpart, it needs a quality test to choose the ﬁlter. This test would be quite expensive in size in an
hardware realization. This is why we recommend to implement it in software.
3.4 F-FCSR-H
In this version, the ﬁlter is known and not key-dependent. This implies that the size of the main register must
be twice the keysize. However, the use of a ﬁxed ﬁlter avoids the requirement for a quality test. Hence a pure
hardware implementation of the stream cipher remains very cheap.
4 Design rationale
4.1 Choice of the connection integer q of the FCSR automaton
Recall the conditions the integer q must satisfy:
• q is a negative prime of size n + 1.
• The order of 2 modulo q is |q| − 1.
• T = (|q| − 1)/2 is a prime.
• If q = 1 − 2d, the Hamming weight of the binary expansion of d is not too small. Typically, W(d) > n/2.
The ﬁrst one is simply to be able to compute the 2-adic integer p/q, with 0 < p < −q, with registers of
size n. Under this constraint, the output is strictly periodic without preperiod.
The second condition implies that the output sequence is periodic with a maximal period 2T = |q| − 1.
When we ﬁlter the internal states of the automaton, we perform the XOR of some sequences of period 2T.
The condition T is a prime ensures that the period of the ﬁltered output is at least T.The weight W(d) corresponds to the number of carries memories: it contributes to the quadratic part of the
automaton. A large value ensures a good diﬀusion of the quadratic properties and avoids linear attacks.
The proposed connection integers are of size respectively 129 and 161 bits. They are chosen randomly
between the integers satisfying Conditions 1. They could be replaced by any prime satisfying these.
4.2 Choice of the ﬁlter
Known ﬁlter: F-FCSR-H
In F-FCSR-H, the ﬁlter is known. We choose for F the integer d, since each ﬁltered cell of the main register
is separated from the other by at least a carry cell. This insures that the 2-adic fractions corresponding to the
ﬁltered cells corresponds to diﬀerent parts of the whole period (typically about 2127 bits) of the FCSR (see [1]
for more details).
Unknown ﬁlter: F-FCSR-8
The dedicated attack described in 3.2.1 of [3] is not possible. The remaining problem is the case of degenerated
ﬁlters, i.e. F = 0, F = 2i or F = 2i + 2i+j with no carry between i and i + j, i.e. for any k, i ≤ k < i + k,
dk = 0. The quality test on the ﬁlter ensures to avoid such situation.
4.3 Key setup and change of IV procedures
We choose to avoid as far as possible other functions than the FCSR automaton and the ﬁlter. It is why we use
the automaton to expand the key and diﬀuse the IV.
Key setup procedure for F-FCSR-8
The key setup procedure is constituted of two distinct parts: the ﬁrst one is used to obtain a non-degenerated
ﬁlter F.
The second part is devoted to the construction of the initial state Minit of the main register. This value
is derived from the key K (and then from the ﬁlter F), but theses will not be easy to exploit in algebraic or
related attacks.
Instead of using an external mechanism, we use 128 rounds of the FCSR automaton: the output Minit is a
function of the key K. However each of the 128 coordinate functions are of algebraic degree 127 or 128, with
no particularly known properties.
Change of IV procedure for F-FCSR-8
In this procedure, the IV value are put into the carry cells to ensure a rapid diﬀusion on the main register. This
diﬀusion is made by 64 rounds of the automaton. If the size of the IV is greatest than 64 bits, this procedure
is repeated twice.
Key setup and change of IV procedures for F-FCSR-H
For the F-FCSR-H stream cipher, there is no distinct procedure between key setup and change of IV. The initial
value of the main register is obtained by concatenation of the IV value (eventually 0) and the 80 bits key. To be
sure that each bit of the IV and the key is well diﬀused, we recommend 128 initialization rounds of the FCSR
automaton before outputting the sequence.
5 Computational eﬃciency in hardware and software
Software eﬃciency was not the main objective of our proposal, as attested by Figure 2. Any platform that
requires to split the register involved in the Galois setup of the FCSR is not suitable for obtaining fast encryption
with FCSR. The Fibonacci setup is not possible since it is slower and more complicated than the Galois setup.
The only way to achieve high throughput with FCSR is the use of SIMD instructions, like Altivec or SSE2.
Clocking the FCSR and the ﬁltering function are quite simple with SIMD instructions (Figure 1 provides the
code for the clocking function). But, the drawback is that, in this case, encrypting 128-bit data blocks is suitable
in order to avoid unaligned memory access./* vector unsigned char define a 128 bit word decomposed in 16 sub-word of length 8 */
vector unsigned char buffer,feedback;
/* bit expansion for feedback computation */
feedback = vec_splat( shiftRegister , 15 );
feedback = vec_sl( feedback , EXPAND );
feedback = vec_sra( feedback , EXPAND );
feedback = vec_and( feedback , RETROACTION );
/* Shift the register */
shiftRegister = vec_srl( shiftRegister , SHIFT );
/* Compute the next state of the register */
buffer = vec_xor( shiftRegister , carryRegister );
carryRegister = vec_and( shiftRegister , carryRegister );
carryRegister = vec_xor( carryRegister , vec_and( buffer , feedback ) );
shiftRegister = vec_xor( buffer , feedback );
Figure 1: Altivec code for one step of FCSR
In addition to our reference implementation, we also provide an Altivec evaluation version of F-FCSR-8.
As expected, the Altivec implementation is the most eﬃcient one and it achieves unexpected performance for
software implementation (20 cycles per Byte). One other advantage is that it does not use table like Snow 2
then memory parameter are not very important for data encryption. SIMD instructions are only required.
Unfortunately, the IV insertion is still complicated and cannot be improved with SIMD instructions.
CISC target parameters performance
Frequency L2 Cache Size Compiler Speed Code IV loading Key loading
Pentium 3 800 Mhz 256KB GCC 3.2.2 92 cycles/B 7.5 KB 10700 cycles/IV 10200 cycles/Key
Pentium 4 2.3 Ghz 512KB GCC 3.2.2 94 cycles/B 9.1 KB 11600 cycles/IV 11300 cycles/Key
Pentium 4 2.6 Ghz 512KB GCC 3.2.2 106 cycles/B 9,2 KB 13400 cycles/IV 13600 cycles/Key
Pentium 4 3.2 Ghz 1MB GCC 3.2.2 101 cycles/B 5.7 KB 11400 cycles/IV 11700 cycles/Key
RISC target parameters performance
Frequency L2 Cache Size Compiler Speed Code IV loading Key loading
PPC 7457 1.2 Ghz 512 KB GCC 3.3.0 84 cycles/B 17 KB 8300 cycles/IV 17000 cycles/Key
Alpha EV67 1Ghz 64 KB GCC 3.4.0 46 cycles/B 20 KB 6200 cycles/IV 5400 cycles/Key
PPC 7457 (altivec) 1.2 Ghz 512 KB GCC 3.3.0 20 cycles/B 13 KB – cycles/IV – cycles/Key
Figure 2: F-FCSR-8 32-bit evaluation
FCSR leads to better performance for hardware applications. One major strength of the F-FCSR-H design
is its short critical path (virtually only one 1 ﬂip ﬂop and 1 or 2 LUT). E0 or A5/1 have the same advantage
but they only output 1 bit per cycle whereas F-FCSR-H outputs 1 byte. This fact is conﬁrmed by our hardware
implementation on a low cost FPGA. The VHDL description is very easy to understand and is not diﬃcult to
apply to F-FCSR-8 or to any variant (e.g. with a smaller or longer FCSR or with another ﬁltering function).
The only drawback of FCSR in hardware conception is the fan-in fan-out problem. The feedback cell of the
register has to be sent to 83 online adders. This implies that the feedback cell and its predecessors have to be
replicated many times. Our F-FCSR-H design is expected to use 243 Flip-Flop cells; 10 additional Flip-Flop
are required for the replication of the last cell of the FCSR.Stream cipher target performance
Flip Flop LUT gate count Speed
E0 Virtex-E V2600E-FG1156 300 - 1637 93 Mb/s
A5/1 Virtex-E HQ800 64 70 932 90 Mb/s
RC4 Virtex-E HQ800 279 - 12952 171 Mb/s
F-FCSR-H Spartan2E 300e-6pq208 253 205 3254 623 Mb/s
Figure 3: Diﬀerent speed of stream cipher on FPGA
Data dor E0, A5/1 and RC4 are from ”Energy, performance, area versus security trade-oﬀs for stream ciphers”
L. Batina, J. Lano, N. Mentens, S.B.¨ 0rs, B. Preneel, I. Verbauwhede, SASC 2004, Brugge.
Note that the speed of the F-FCSR-8 hardware implementation is the same as F-FCSR-H, that is 623 Mb/s.